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Deconstructing the Epistemic
Challenges to Mass Atrocity
Prosecutions
Nancy Amoury Combs*
Abstract
Mass atrocity prosecutions are credited with advancing a host
of praiseworthy objectives. They are believed to impose
much-needed retribution, deter future atrocities, and affirm the
rule of law in previously lawless societies. However, mass atrocity
prosecutions will accomplish none of these laudable ends unless
they are able to find accurate facts. Convicting the appropriate
individuals of the appropriate crimes is a necessary and
foundational condition for the success of mass atrocity
prosecutions. But it is a condition that is frequently difficult to
meet, as mass atrocity prosecutions are often bedeviled by pervasive
and invidious obstacles to accurate fact-finding. This Article
deconstructs those obstacles. Isolating fact-finding challenges and
ascertaining their impact is no mean feat because mass atrocity
prosecutions are a heterogeneous combination of a variety of
different kinds of crimes and different kinds of proceedings. Mass
atrocity prosecutions take place in international courts, domestic
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courts, and hybrid international/domestic courts. Mass atrocity
prosecutions encompass international crimes and domestic crimes,
and they encompass a wide range of horrific acts perpetrated by a
wide range of individuals, acting in a wide range of contexts.
Previous scholarship has identified international criminal law as
a discipline intensely marked by pluralism; this Article contends
that that same pluralism characterizes the fact-finding challenges
that confront international criminal prosecutions. Moreover, this
Article advances the debate by isolating three particularly
significant factors likely to create factual uncertainty at trial.
Taken together, this examination produces a startling revelation:
that the “gold standard” of mass atrocity prosecution—
international criminal tribunal prosecutions of international
crimes—is at greatest risk for inaccurate fact-finding at trial.
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I. Introduction
International criminal law has the potential to be a powerful
and effective means of deterring mass atrocities and imposing
well-deserved punishment on those who perpetrate those
atrocities. However, international criminal law also faces
unprecedented challenges. Some of these challenges generate
widespread publicity. The decision of three African states to
withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC), for
instance, made headlines worldwide,1 as did the high-profile battle
between the ICC and Kenya’s President and Vice President.2 Other
1. See Somini Sengupta, As 3 African Nations Vow to Exit, International
Court
Faces
its
Own
Trial,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
26,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/27/world/africa/africa-international-criminalcourt.html?_r=0 (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (“Three nations, all from Africa, have
announced that they will no longer work with the tribunal, intensifying a
longstanding debate over whether it is biased against the continent.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). For the ICC, things may get worse before
they get better. See, e.g., Elias Meseret, African Leaders OK Strategy for Mass
Withdrawal
From
ICC,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Jan.
31,
2017),
https://apnews.com/0e19488f91bc4ccfad1e167c6c5742d5/african-leaders-okstrategy-mass-withdrawal-icc (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (“Late last year, South
Africa, Burundi and Gambia all announced plans to leave the court, leading to
concerns that other states would follow.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
2. See, e.g., Kenya President: International Criminal Court Not Impartial,
VOA NEWS (Dec. 12, 2016, 9:21 AM), http://www.voanews.com/a/kenya-presidentinternational-criminal-court-not-impartial/3632789.html (last visited Jan. 22,
2018) (“Kenyatta was elected in 2013 as he and his running mate, William Ruto,
faced criminal charges at the ICC over their alleged roles in post-election violence
in 2007-2008.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Kenya’s
William Ruto Wins ICC Witness Ruling, BBC NEWS (Feb. 12, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35563556 (last visited Jan. 22, 2018)
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challenges are less publicized but just as concerning. The challenge
that forms the focus of this Article is the so-called “epistemic
critique of international criminal law.”3 That critique can take
many forms. Some scholars, for instance, accuse international
criminal judgments of exhibiting selective contextualization;4
other scholars question the ability of international criminal law to
create a historical record;5 and still other scholars explore, more
broadly and philosophically, the limits of the knowledge that we
can attain about atrocities.6 My own scholarship launched one
highly pragmatic strand of epistemic criticism by identifying
pervasive and invidious obstacles to accurate fact-finding in
international criminal proceedings.7
(detailing the prosecutors’ struggle to build a case against Kenyan President
Ruto) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See Doing Justice to Truth: Taking Stock of the Epistemic Critique of
International Criminal Tribunals, U. COPENHAGEN (June 9, 2016),
http://jura.ku.dk/icourts/calendar/2016/doing-justice-to-truth/ (last visited Jan.
22, 2018) (featuring more than a dozen scholars and practitioners from a broad
range of disciplines at a two-day conference to address the topic of an epistemic
critique of the International Criminal Tribunals) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
4. See, e.g., Barrie Sander, Doing Justice to History: The Construction of
Historical Narratives Within International Criminal Courts (2017) (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, Graduate Institute of International Development Studies), at Part
Four (‘The Culpability Frame’) (discussing consequences of selectivity both for the
culpability of the individuals on trial and the broader narratives constructed by
judges in their judgments) (on file with author).
5. See, e.g., MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE
LAW 79–94 (1997) (“The relation between criminal judgment and historical
interpretation is problematic in a myriad of ways.”); Timothy William Waters, A
Kind of Judgment: Searching for Judicial Narratives After Death, 42 GEO. WASH.
INT’L L. REV. 279, 343 (2010) (arguing that the narrative theory of judicial
decisionmaking is undermined when a trial does not reach a verdict); Richard
Ashby Wilson, Judging History: The Historical Record of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 908, 909–16 (2005)
(“[C]ourts are inappropriate venues to construct wide-ranging historical
explanations of past conflicts.”); see also Nigel Eltringham, The Judgement is Not
Made Now; The Judgement Will be Made in the Future: Positive Appraisals of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s Historical Record among
Politically Motivated Defence Lawyers (2016), http://humanityjournal.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/07/09.-N.-Eltringham-Judgement-Is-not-Made-Now.pdf.
6. See Henry Redwood, Power, Knowledge and Ownership—The Archives
of the ICTR (June 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (highlighting the limits of
knowledge about mass atrocities even when information about those atrocities
are contained in massive archives) (on file with author).
7. See NANCY AMOURY COMBS, FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS: THE
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What neither I nor any other scholar has adequately explored,
however, are the factors that give rise to these severe fact-finding
obstacles. Do some prosecutions feature greater factual
uncertainty and, if so, can we identify and isolate the causal
factors? This article will tackle these questions, and in doing so, it
will reveal the complexity and nuance that surrounds epistemic
criticisms of mass atrocity prosecutions. This complexity and
nuance derives largely from the complexity and nuance that
surrounds mass atrocity prosecutions themselves. Most
international criminal law scholarship, including my own, focuses
exclusively on prosecutions of international crimes conducted by
international courts or hybrid international-domestic courts,8 but
many other possibilities exist. In addition to international and
hybrid courts, mass atrocities are also prosecuted in a range of
different kinds of domestic courts.9 Moreover, some mass atrocities
UNCERTAIN EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
4 (2010) [hereinafter FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS] (“My study will reveal that
international criminal trials confront severe impediments to accurate
fact-finding, impediments that should give rise to serious doubts about the
accuracy of the trial Chambers’ factual determinations.”). Some other works
explore these questions as well. See, e.g., Martin Witteveen, Closing the Gap in
Truth Finding: From the Facts of the Field to the Judge’s Chambers, in
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 383 (Alette Smeulers ed., 2010) (noting such
fact-finding difficulties as cultural and linguistic barriers with victims of mass
atrocities, among other issues); Mark Findlay & Sylvia Ngane, Sham of the Moral
Court? Testimony Sold as the Spoils of War, 1 GLOBAL J. COMP. L. 73, 74 (2012)
(analyzing the shortcomings of witness testimony in the ICC); John Jackson,
Finding the Best Epistemic Fit for International Criminal Tribunals, 7 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 17, 19 (2009) (arguing “that while the present hybrid of adversarial
gathering and presentation of evidence combined with its liberal admission may
satisfy certain minimum guarantees of fairness, it falls short of providing the
optimal epistemic conditions for ensuring that verdicts are based upon a rigorous
investigation and testing of the evidence”).
8. See, e.g., NANCY AMOURY COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: CONSTRUCTING A RESTORATIVE JUSTICE APPROACH 3 (2007)
(examining the guilty plea practices of the ICTY, ICTR and Special Panels in East
Timor); FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 5 (identifying fact-finding
obstacles in ICTR, SCSL and Special Panels trials); Nancy Amoury Combs, Grave
Crimes and Weak Evidence: A Fact-Finding Evolution in International Criminal
Law, 58 HARV. INT’L L. J. 47, 55 (2017) (conducting an empirical study of ICTR
trials); Nancy Amoury Combs, Seeking Inconsistency: Advancing Pluralism in
International Criminal Sentencing, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2016) (developing
sentencing theory for international and hybrid tribunals).
9. When mass atrocities are prosecuted in the state where the crimes took
place, they can be prosecuted in that state’s ordinary courts. See STEVEN R.
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are prosecuted as domestic crimes, whereas others are prosecuted
as international crimes.10 Finally, mixing and matching takes
place between the categories. A mass atrocity characterized as a
domestic crime may be prosecuted in an international court,11
whereas a mass atrocity characterized as an international crime
may be prosecuted in domestic court.12 Each of these variations has
epistemic implications.
Variations between different sorts of mass atrocities also have
epistemic consequences. Mass atrocities can comprise a wide range
of unspeakable acts committed in a wide range of circumstances.
Certainly, large-scale killings qualify as mass atrocities, but so do

RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 169–71, 173–78 (2d ed. 2001) (describing Ethiopian,
Rwandan and Argentine prosecutions). They can also be prosecuted in specialized
courts that are created specifically to prosecute mass atrocities. See, e.g., The
Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, HUM. & CONST. RIGHTS (Mar. 26, 2008),
http://www.hrcr.org/hottopics/statute/section1.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2018)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In addition, pursuant to
universal jurisdiction, foreign domestic courts can prosecute mass atrocities that
occurred in other states. See Karinne Coombes, Universal Jurisdiction: A Means
to End Impunity or a Threat to Friendly International Relations?, 43 GEO. WASH.
INT’L L. REV. 419, 427 (2011) (“[I]f a crime transcends the interest of a single state,
this supports vesting jurisdiction over the crime to all states.”).
10. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE: CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS 1 (2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/257773.pdf
(“[Mass atrocities] may be investigated and prosecuted by the International
Criminal Court, where it has jurisdiction, but they are also penalized in the
domestic laws of many countries.”).
11. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, for instance, is currently prosecuting
its defendants for crimes under Lebanese law, such as intentional homicide and
terrorism. See generally Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case No. STL-11-01I11PTJ,
Indictment, ¶ 1 (June 10, 2011). Similarly, the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(SCSL) had jurisdiction over Sierra Leonean crimes, Statute of the Special Court
for Sierra Leone, art. 5, U.N. Doc. S/2002/21246, and the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) have jurisdiction over Cambodian
crimes, Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of
Democratic Kampuchea, art. 3, Oct. 27, 2004, ECCC Doc. No. NSIRKMJI004/006
12. States frequently provide their courts criminal jurisdiction over
international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
See Jonathan I. Charney, International Criminal Law and the Role of Domestic
Courts, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 120, 121–22 (2001) (describing several former heads of
state who were not afforded immunity in their home courts and noting that “these
developments may reflect the entry of a new era in which domestic prosecutions
for international crimes will flourish”).
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widespread rapes, tortures, detentions, and other inhumane acts.13
Mass atrocities also vary in size and scope. An isolated set of war
crimes qualifies as a mass atrocity as does a genocide that kills
many hundreds of thousands. Some mass atrocities are committed
by state-sponsored armies, whereas others are committed by rebel
forces. Some mass atrocities are committed during brief internal
armed conflicts; others are committed during protracted wars
involving numerous nations, and still others occur during
ostensible peace-time. Finally, mass atrocities can take place in
dramatically different locations: for instance, mass atrocities were
committed on Guantanamo Bay—that is, on the territory of
arguably the richest, most industrialized nation on the planet.14
And they were committed in the most desperately poor regions of
Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
Mass atrocities and their prosecutions, therefore, are
characterized by a pluralism that has only just begun to be
systematically examined.15 This Article contends that that same
pluralism characterizes the epistemic challenges that confront the
prosecutions of mass atrocities. In particular, the epistemic
challenges bedeviling a mass atrocity prosecution are a product of
a host of factors relevant to the facts and circumstances of the
atrocity and its prosecution. As these factors combine and coalesce
13.

See U.N., FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS FOR MASS ATROCITY CRIMES: A TOOL
PREVENTION
27
(2014),
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/framework%20of%20analysis
%20for%20atrocity%20crimes_en.pdf (defining “crimes against humanity” as
inclusive of many atrocious crimes, including rape, torture, and “severe
deprivation of physical liberty” via the Rome Statute).
14. John Haltiwanger, Torture Used by U.S. Military at Guantanamo Bay
Despite Being Banned, UN Says, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 13, 2017),
http://www.newsweek.com/torture-used-us-military-guantanamo-bay-despitebeing-banned-un-says-747373 (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
15. Most accounts of the pluralism of international criminal law explore
variations in the prosecutions of mass atrocities. See, e.g., PLURALISM IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3 (Elies van Sliedregt & Sergey Vasiliev eds., 2014)
(“The first layer of complexity consists in the fact that [international criminal
justice] is centered on the international and hybrid criminal courts, bound
together into a decentralized and hierarchical ‘community.’”). See generally
Gerhard Hafner, Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International
Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 849 (2004); Volker Nerlich, Daring Diversity–Why There
is Nothing Wrong with ‘Fragmentation’ in International Criminal Procedures, 26
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 777 (2013).
FOR
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in different ways, the epistemic challenges likewise shift and
transform.
At the same time, this Article’s detailed exploration of these
epistemic challenges reveals that three factors stand out as having
particularly significant epistemic consequences. They are: the
location of the atrocity,16 the nature of the atrocity,17 and the body
prosecuting the atrocity.18 Part II addresses the location of the
atrocity. It argues that a mass atrocity’s location—and in
particular the development status of that location—has a dramatic
impact both on the kinds of evidence available as well as the
probative value of that evidence. Part III considers various
descriptive features of the atrocities themselves. Part III first
documents the way in which the large size and scope of atrocity
crimes gives rise to evidentiary challenges that do not arise in the
prosecutions of discrete, isolated crimes committed in the same
locations. That is, the size and scope of a mass atrocity stands as
an independent factor driving fact-finding challenges. Part III also
contends that the characterization of a mass atrocity as an
international crime, as opposed to a domestic crime, increases
fact-finding challenges. Finally, Part IV explores the way in which
different prosecutorial bodies face different epistemic challenges.
Specifically, Part IV contends that trials in international courts
and tribunals generally feature more pronounced fact-finding
challenges than similar trials in domestic bodies. The Article
concludes by observing that, although each of these factors
independently gives rise to evidentiary difficulties, they tend to
coalesce in the current international tribunal prosecutions of
international crimes.19 That is, international criminal tribunals
that prosecute international crimes in developing nations face the
most severe obstacles to accurate fact-finding.
This conclusion is worrisome. International tribunal
prosecutions of international crimes in developing nations have
constituted a core feature—indeed, some would say a necessary
component—of the much-lauded “justice cascade”20 that has finally
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Infra Part II.A.
Infra Part III.
Infra Part IV.
Infra Part V.
See KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS
PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS 5 (2011) (using the term “justice
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begun imposing accountability on large-scale human rights
offenders. Indeed, it was through just such international tribunal
prosecutions that the world saw its first genocide conviction,21 its
first conviction for the enlistment and conscription of child
soldiers,22 and its first sitting president brought to justice,23 among
many other landmarks.24 But the analysis herein suggests that, for
all of their accomplishments, international tribunal prosecutions
of international crimes in developing nations are also uniquely
likely to suffer from the kinds of profound epistemic challenges
that can seriously undermine efforts to use criminal prosecutions
to prevent and punish large-scale violence.
II. Location, Location, Location: The Evidentiary Implications of
the Place Where the Crime Took Place
As noted, mass atrocities can vary in countless respects, and
each variation can have evidentiary implications. For instance,
forensic evidence may exist to link perpetrators with the mass
killings that they committed years or decades before,25 but not with
the mass rapes that they committed at the same time.26 Similarly,
cascade” to mean an “interrelated, dramatic new trend in world politics toward
holding individual state officials, including heads of state, criminally accountable
for human rights violations”).
21. See generally Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement
(Sept. 2, 1998) [hereinafter Akayesu Judgment].
22. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment pursuant
to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 1358 (Mar. 14, 2012), https://www.icccpi.int/drc/lubanga/Documents/LubangaEng.pdf
[hereinafter
Lubanga
Judgment].
23. See generally Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgement
(May 18, 2012) (finding President Charles Taylor of the National Patriotic Front
of Liberia guilty for crimes against humanity, including murder, rape, and sexual
slavery).
24. It was likewise in international tribunal prosecutions of international
crimes in developing nations that the gender-based crimes of forced marriage and
sexual slavery were first defined and prosecuted. For an example, see Prosecutor
v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 187–196 (Feb. 22, 2008).
25. See generally Marija Definis Gojanović & Davorka Sutlović, Skeletal
Remains from World War II Mass Grave: From Discovery to Identification, 48
CROAT. MED. J. 520 (2007) (conducting a forensic analysis on human remains
found in Croatia to determine whether a human rights violation occurred).
26. See OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, MANUAL ON
THE EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION AND DOCUMENTATION OF TORTURE AND OTHER
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the criminal acts of government officials or high-level perpetrators
may give rise to large quantities of documentary evidence,27
whereas the criminal acts of non-state actors and/or low-level
perpetrators may not.28 Although all such variations will have
some evidentiary consequences, one factor has particularly
significant evidentiary impact: the location of the crimes. And,
from an evidentiary point of view, the most influential aspect of
the location of the crimes is its level of development. Most
specifically, the development level of a crime’s location can have a
dramatic influence on both the kinds of evidence that are available
to prove the crimes and the probative value of that evidence.
A. Available Evidence
Trials of crimes that occur in developed nations typically
feature a variety of different kinds of evidence. Certainly,
eyewitness testimony stands as a core component of many such
criminal trials,29 but that testimony is also frequently
supplemented by an array of non-testimonial evidence.30
Witnesses in developed nations sometimes videotape or audiotape
key actions,31 and surveillance cameras often passively document
CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, ¶ 223, U.N. Doc.
HR/P/PT/8/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.04.XIV.3 (2004) (suggesting that no physical
evidence of rape exists one week after the commission of the crime).
27. Christian Axboe Nielsen, Leadership Analysis in International Criminal
Justice, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS: CHALLENGES, LESSONS
LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES 7 (Adejoké Babington-Ashaye & Aimée Comrie eds.,
2016) (“[L]eadership documentation can also often be a good deal more revealing
and self-incriminatory than the causal student of international conflicts and
authoritarian regimes might commonly believe.”). But see Alex Whiting, In
International Criminal Prosecutions, Justice Delayed can be Justice Delivered, 50
HARV. INT’L L.J. 323, 338 (2009) (“With respect to linkage, the accused commander
is often far removed from the crimes and there are generally no documents
directly connecting him to the commission of those crimes.”).
28. See Whiting, supra note 27, at 339 (“When the case involves non-state
actors, the task of proving linkage becomes even more complex.”).
29. See, e.g., SCOTT CHRISTIANSON, INNOCENT: INSIDE WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS CASES 28 (2004) (“[E]yewitness testimony accounts continue to
provide the foundation, and sometimes the only basis, for many prosecutions.”).
30. See, e.g., 1 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, JONES ON
EVIDENCE § 1:3 (7th ed. 2016).
31. See, e.g., Andrew Rosado Shaw, Note, Our Duty in Light of the Law’s
Irrelevance: Police Brutality and Civilian Recordings, 20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
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important events.32 Communications, such as letters, emails,
phone calls, voicemail messages, and texts, also frequently help to
prove the elements of crimes, as do other forms of documentary
evidence, such as records, advertisements, and diaries.33 Even
when cases turn on the veracity and accuracy of witness testimony,
non-testimonial evidence can serve to reduce the number of
contested issues and to corroborate or refute the witnesses’
testimony.34 A witness will not be able to convince the judge or jury
that the defendant accompanied her to a movie theatre, for
instance, if a surveillance video shows that the witness entered the
theatre by herself. And phone records documenting numerous calls
between a defendant and an alleged co-conspirator serve to
corroborate testimony tying the defendant to the criminal
activities of the co-conspirator.35
Those prosecuting crimes in developing nations, by contrast,
tend to possess far less non-testimonial evidence of the crimes they
POL’Y 161, 162 (2012) (discussing civilians’ use of cell phones to record police
misconduct); METTE MORTENSEN, JOURNALISM AND EYEWITNESS IMAGES: DIGITAL
MEDIA, PARTICIPATION, AND CONFLICT 3 (2014) (“As increasing proportions of the
world’s population are able to disseminate their photographs and videos of
ongoing conflicts, an unprecedented landslide of visual information has emerged
within a relatively short time span.”).
32. For example, one of the key pieces of evidence identifying the suspects in
the 2013 Boston Marathon terrorist attack was surveillance camera footage from
a nearby department store. See generally Sari Horwitz et al., Boston Marathon
Bombings: Investigators Zero in on Possible Suspect, WASH. POST (April 17, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/boston-marathonbombings-investigators-sifting-through-images-debris-for-clues/2013/04/17/a523
8caa-a 75b-11e2-b029-8fb7e977ef71_story.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
33. See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 30, § 1:3 (“[A] common form of
evidence is documentary evidence such as public records, private writings,
business records, photographs, maps, and the like.”).
34. See id. § 11:7 (“[E]vidence is often relevant because it circumstantially
corroborates other evidence.”).
35. See HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., DIGITAL FINGERPRINTS: USING ELECTRONIC
EVIDENCE TO ADVANCE PROSECUTIONS AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 3
(2014),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/HRC/Digital_fingerprints_interior_
cover2.pdf [hereinafter DIGITAL FINGERPRINTS] (“The strongest cases are often
those in which several different kinds of evidence . . . can corroborate witness
testimony.”); see also United States v. Munguia, 273 F. App’x 517, 518–19 (6th
Cir. 2011) (affirming the district court’s holding that cell phone records be
admitted as evidence because “the evidence was highly probative as corroboration
of the co-conspirators’ testimony that they were in contact with [the defendant]”).

234

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 223 (2018)

seek to prove. Certainly, surveillance cameras are less prevalent
in developing nations,36 and computers and other forms of
technology are also rarer.37 So, trials of crimes in developing
locations are less likely to feature audio, video, or cellular evidence.
Moreover, literacy rates are lower in developing nations—
sometimes dramatically so38—and those who are illiterate are not
writing letters, keeping written records, or otherwise documenting
their activities in the way that literate individuals do. For that
reason, even basic evidence of identity, such as birth certificates,
are unavailable in some developing countries,39 as is evidence of
ownership, such as deeds.40 Indeed, records of all sorts, including

36. Consider that, in 2014, the African surveillance camera market was
worth approximately $200 million, compared to the global market, which was
worth over $15 billion. See Josh Woodhouse, Potential in African Video
Surveillance Market as Market Size Surpasses $200 Million, IHS TECH. (Jan. 30,
2014), https://technology.ihs.com/485243/potential-in-african-video-surveillancemarket-as-market-size-surpasses-200-million (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
37. In Sierra Leone, for instance, between 2008 and 2012, only 33% of the
population used cell phones, and 1.3% used the internet. At a Glance: Sierra
Leone,
UNICEF,
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/sierraleone_statistics.html# (last updated
Dec. 27, 2013) (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
38. Many countries in Western Europe, such as Germany, France, and the
United Kingdom, have had literacy rates at or above 99% for at least a decade.
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2010). By contrast,
developing nations such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, as of 2015, had literacy rates of 47.6%, 48.1%, and 63.8%, respectively.
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2016); see also Edward
Sawyer & Tim Kelsall, Truth vs. Justice? Popular Views on the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 7 ONLINE J.
PEACE & CONFLICT RES. 36, 40 (2007) (reporting on a survey of Sierra Leoneans in
which 45% of those interviewed had either never been to school or had not
completed primary education).
39. For example, only 31% of births are registered in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, 49% in the Central African Republic, and 51% in Sierra
Leone. For further information, see UNICEF, TABLE 9: CHILD PROTECTION (2011),
https://www.unicef.org/protection/Table_9_child_labour.pdf.
40. See Greenville Barnes et al., Land Registration Modernization in
Developing Economies: A Discussion of the Main Problems in Central/Eastern
Europe, Latin America, and the Caribbean, 12 URISA J. 27, 28–30 (2000) (noting
that “[i]n many cases, [land] transfers are not recorded by following legally
defined and documented procedures”).
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employment, banking, and medical, can be hard to come by in
developing societies.41
For this reason, the evidence used to prove mass atrocities
perpetrated in developing nations can look very different from the
evidence used to prove mass atrocities perpetrated in developed
nations. A comparison of the evidentiary bases for convictions at
the first two modern international criminal tribunals—the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)—
provides a striking display of these differences. Indeed, the
differences are particularly notable because the tribunals were
similar in so many important respects. The tribunals were
established at about the same time to prosecute crimes that
occurred at about the same time.42 The tribunals were established
through the same mechanism—a U.N. Security Council
Resolution—and were structured in the same way.43 The tribunals
initially shared a Prosecutor;44 they continued to share an Appeals
Chamber,45 and they utilized virtually the same procedural rules.46
41. See Leora Klapper et al., Income Biggest Barrier to Banking in
Developing Countries, GALLUP (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/
poll/159380/income-biggest-barrier-banking-developing-countries.aspx
(last
visited Jan. 22, 2018) (“Approximately one in five adults cites lack of proper
documentation as a barrier, regardless of income level. Many banks require proof
of permanent residence or wages slips, and in countries where large numbers of
people are informally involved in the economy, this documentation can be difficult
to come by.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also
Christopher Cramer, Carlos Oya & John Sender, Lifting the Blinkers: A New View
of Power, Diversity, and Poverty in Mozambican Rural Labour Markets, in RURAL
WAGE EMPLOYMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND POLICY 95
n.14 (Carlos Oya & Nicola Pontara eds., 2015) (reporting that in Mozambique,
between 42% and 80% of middle-scale agricultural farms employ temporary
workers, “who by definition are not officially registered for the purposes of
employment records”).
42. See Lilian A. Barria & Steven D. Roper, How Effective are International
Criminal Tribunals? An Analysis of the ICTY and the ICTR, 9 INT’L J. HUM. RTS.
349, 350–51 (2006).
43. See id. at 354 (“Similar to the ICTY . . . [the U.N. Security Council
passed] Resolution 955 authori[zing] the creation of the ICTR . . . .”).
44. See S.C. Res. 955 art. 15, ¶ 3 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]
(“The Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia shall
also serve as the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for Rwanda.”).
45. See id. art. 13(3).
46. Compare ICTY, RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE (2013) (as
amended),
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure
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However, despite these many similarities, the evidentiary bases of
the tribunals’ judgments differed significantly. To be sure, witness
testimony formed a key component in both tribunals’ trials,47 but
for the ICTR, it formed virtually the exclusive basis for the
tribunal’s convictions.48 The same is true for two other tribunals
that prosecuted crimes in developing nations. In particular, I have
carefully examined the evidentiary bases of trials at the ICTR, the
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), and the Special Panels for
Serious Crimes in East Timor (Special Panels), and I found that
very little non-testimonial evidence was submitted and almost
none of it was central to any factual finding.49 By contrast, the
ICTY, which prosecuted crimes committed in the more developed
former Yugoslavia, collected massive quantities of documents and

evidence/IT032Rev50_en.pdf, with ICTR, RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
(2015)
(as
amended),
http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legallibrary/150513-rpe-en-fr.pdf.
47. See Patricia M. Wald, Dealing with Witnesses in War Crimes Trials:
Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 217, 219 (2014)
(providing statistics on the ICTY’s use of witnesses).
48. See Göran Sluiter, The ICTR and the Protection of Witnesses, 3 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 962, 963 (2005); see also Joanna Pozen, Note, Justice Obscured: The
Non-Disclosure of Witnesses’ Identities in ICTR Trials, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 281, 281 (2006) (comparing the ICTR to other international tribunals that
relied more on documentary evidence rather than witness testimony).
49. See FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 12–14 (noting that
the vast majority of evidence used at the ICTR, SCSL, and Special Panels was
witness testimony). Prosecutions at the ECCC, by contrast, have featured
non-trivial quantities of documentary evidence because the Khmer Rouge
documented many of their atrocities. See HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT: USING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE TO ADVANCE PROSECUTIONS AT
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 5 (2012), https://www.law.berkeley.
edu/files/HRC/HRC_Beyond_Reasonable_Doubt_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT] (“[T]he Court has relied heavily on documentary evidence,
including lists of prisoners who were executed, photographs, and annotations
written on ‘confessions’ of prisoners by their torturers.”); Prosecutor v. Kaing
Guek Eav “Duch,” Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/TC, Judgement, ¶ 56 (July 26,
2010) [hereinafter Duch Judgment] (“Over the course of the trial, approximately
1,000 documents were put before the Chamber and subjected to examination.”).
But the ECCC is unusual in this regard for modern tribunals.
In a forthcoming piece, I document the way in which criminal evidence is
changing in developing societies. In particular, in recent years, prosecutors of
mass atrocities in developing nations have begun gaining access to greater
quantities of non-testimonial evidence. Nancy Amoury Combs, The New Face of
International Criminal Evidence (forthcoming).
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other non-testimonial evidence,50 and it made good use of it.51
Virtually all ICTY cases featured some highly-probative
non-testimonial evidence, and cases that involved high-level
political and military leaders featured a great deal of it.52
50. See Alexander Zahar, Pluralism and the Rights of the Accused in
International Criminal Proceedings, in PLURALISM IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 224, 233–36 (Elies van Sliedregt & Sergey Vasiliev eds., 2014) (discussing
the “sheer volume of evidence” during ICTY proceedings); see also Marko Divac
Öberg, Processing Evidence and Drafting Judgments in International Criminal
Trial Chambers, 24 CRIM. L.F. 113, 117–18 (2013) (“In the Popović and others
case . . . more than 58,000 exhibit pages, not counting translations, were
admitted into evidence at trial . . . .”); Nielsen, supra note 27, at 15 (noting that
at the ICTY, the “only persons who could reasonably hope to digest and master
document collections consisting of potentially hundreds of thousands of pages
were those analysts whose full-time job was to do so”).
51. Nielsen, supra note 27, at 8 (noting that personnel and financial records
“featured prominently in the prosecution of the genocide committed in
Srebrenica”).
52. See, e.g., Carla Del Ponte, Investigation and Prosecution of Large-Scale
Crimes at the International Level: The Experience of the ICTY, 4 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 539, 554–55 (2006) (describing minutes of the Municipal assembly relied on
in the Stakić trial, the recordings of President Tudjman’s meetings relied on in
the Naletilić and Martinović trials, and the transcripts of intercepts relied on in
the Krstić trial). ICTY Trial Chambers benefited from considerable documentary
evidence found in military archives. For instance:
[I]n the Galić and Dragomir Milošević cases, detailed military
documents as to the movements of armed forces and orders given to
conduct military activities proved crucial to establishing the pattern of
shelling and sniping in Sarajevo. In Mrkšić and Šljivančanin, military
documents were used in the case against two senior military leaders
for their failure to prevent the torture and killing of hundreds of
prisoners of war evacuated from the Vukovar hospital. Likewise in
the Stakić, Brđanin and Krajišnik cases, minutes of meetings of
municipal, regional and State political bodies proved important in
establishing the existence of joint criminal enterprises at leadership
levels to ethnically cleanse large parts of Bosnia.
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEB., ANNUAL REPORT ¶ 89 (2009–2010), https://www.stltsl.org/en/documents/president-s-reports-and-memoranda/226-Annual-Report2009-2010. Videos also proved an important source of probative evidence at the
ICTY. In Kupreškić, for instance, international troops apparently visited a
massacre site a few hours after the crimes were perpetrated and filmed the
destruction they found. Id. Similarly, in Krstić, prosecutors submitted the video
from a TV interview of the defendant which showed buses removing Bosnian
Muslim refugees from Potočari right behind the defendant. Prosecutor v. Krstić,
Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement, ¶ 348 (Aug. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Krstić
Judgment]. The video contradicted the defendant’s claim that he was only in
Potočari for a brief period and neither saw nor heard anything alerting him to the
ongoing removal of Bosnian Muslim refugees. Id.
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Prosecutions that rely almost exclusively on witness
testimony feature greater factual uncertainty for the simple reason
that the accuracy of witness testimony is frequently uncertain.
Although eyewitness testimony used to be considered a
particularly reliable form of evidence, a wide range of field
experiments in recent years have demonstrated the frequent
fallibility of eyewitness perception.53 And the inaccuracies are not
confined to field experiments. In the United States, DNA testing
has confirmed the problematic nature of eyewitness testimony by
showing that nearly 80% of American wrongful convictions can be
attributed to eyewitness error.54 This research, therefore, suggests
the unsurprising conclusion that fact-finding based solely on
eyewitness testimony is less likely to be accurate than fact-finding
that is additionally supported by non-testimonial evidence.55
B. Problematic Features of Available Evidence
The previous section indicates that the location of the mass
atrocity influences the kinds of evidence that are available to prove
the mass atrocity. More particularly, it suggests that prosecutions
53. See BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION:
THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 8–13 (1995) (describing field
experiments that show high likelihood of inaccuracies in eyewitness
identifications); Douglas J. Narby et al., The Effects of Witness, Target, and
Situational Factors on Eyewitness Identifications, in PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES IN
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 23, 24–48 (Siegfried L. Sporer et al. eds., 1996)
(analyzing the factors that influence a witness’s ability to perceive information
correctly and store the information in their memory); Brian L. Cutler et al.,
Conceptual, Practical, and Empirical Issues Associated with Eyewitness
Identification Test Media, in ADULT EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CURRENT TRENDS
AND DEVELOPMENTS 163, 166–181 (David F. Ross et al. eds., 1994) (discussing
three controlled experiments that tested eyewitness identification accuracy); see
also Public Prosecutor v. Joseph Mpambara, Case Nos. 09/750009-06 and
09/750007-07, Judgment, Chapter 6, ¶¶ 7, 8 (District Court of The Hague, The
Netherlands Mar. 23, 2009) (summarizing research).
54. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 48 (2011); Deborah Davis & Elizabeth Loftus, The
Dangers of Eyewitnesses for the Innocent: Learning from the Past and Projecting
into the Age of Social Media, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 769, 770 (2012).
55. Cf. DIGITAL FINGERPRINTS, supra note 35, at 5 (quoting an interview
originally broadcasted on Radio Netherlands Worldwide between Franck Petit
and former ICC Judge Bruno Cotte, where it was noted that witness testimonies
are “often fragile”).
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of mass atrocities occurring in developing nations face greater
fact-finding challenges because they are forced to rely more heavily
on eyewitness testimony. This section suggests that the location of
the crime not only influences the quantity and kinds of available
evidence, but also its probative value. To be sure, the inherent
unreliability of witness testimony transcends location. That is,
there is no reason to believe that eyewitness testimony of crimes
in developing nations is any more or less reliable than eyewitness
testimony of crimes in developed nations.56 However, there is
reason to believe that eyewitness testimony of crimes in developing
nations may be less detailed than eyewitness testimony of crimes
in developed nations.
After reviewing thousands of pages of trial transcripts relating
to international crimes in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and East Timor,
I discovered that many witnesses from those locations failed to
provide fact-finders with information that is highly relevant to
proving or disproving the criminal charges. For instance, many
witnesses were unable or unwilling to date the events they
witnessed with any sort of precision;57 many were unable or
unwilling to estimate distances or provide other estimations;58 and
many were unable or unwilling to read maps or make use of
sketches, photographs, or other two-dimensional representations
of crime scenes or other locations.59 Finally, many were unfamiliar
with the kinds of details that might be useful to fact-finders, such
as the make and model of a car or the type of weapon used in an
attack.60 To be sure, many witnesses in these trials were willing
and able to provide such information. Moreover, witnesses from
every location in the world sometimes fail to answer some of the
questions put to them on the witness stand. That said, the types of
56. Dr. John Charles Yuille, a Canadian forensic psychologist who testified
as an expert in the Ntaganda case, opined for instance, that “there is no evidence
that basic memory processes are affected by culture. Culture can influence what
is remembered and how the memory is described but, as far as we know, culture
does not impact the underlying memory processes.” Prosecutor v. Ntaganda,
ICC-01/04-02/06-T-87-ENG, Transcript, at 6 (Apr. 21, 2016).
57. See FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 24–27.
58. See id. at 27–36; see also Witteveen, supra note 7, at 397 (recalling an
interview with a witness who estimated a distance to be two kilometers when it
was in fact 100 kilometers).
59. See FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 36–38.
60. See id. at 38–39.
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questions that the witnesses in my study failed to answer and the
frequency with which they failed to answer them were notable. In
particular, my research suggested that Rwandan, Sierra Leonean,
and East Timorese witnesses frequently failed to convey the kind
of information that is “crucial to the Trial Chamber’s ability to find
facts and assess credibility.”61
As noted in subpart A, a cursory comparison between ICTY
and ICTR trials showed that ICTY convictions were based on a
wider range of different kinds of evidence than ICTR convictions.
Similarly, as relevant here, a cursory comparison between witness
testimony at the ICTY, on the one hand, and witness testimony at
the ICTR, SCSL, and Special Panels, on the other, shows a notable
difference in the quantity of information the two sets of witnesses
conveyed. I must acknowledge that I reviewed far fewer ICTY
transcripts than ICTR, SCSL, and Special Panels transcripts. But
I did review enough to convince me of a qualitative difference
between the two sets of witness testimonies. By and large, ICTY
witnesses answered the who, what, where, and when questions
that were asked of them. Many ICTR, SCSL, and Special Panels
witnesses did as well, but a far greater proportion than at the ICTY
did not.
Although a host of factors undoubtedly drive the differences
between the two sets of witness testimonies, there is good reason
to believe that the differing development levels in the relevant
countries played a substantial role. Certainly, many of the
Rwandan, Sierra Leonean, and Timorese witnesses who failed to
answer questions on the stand explained that failure by pointing
to their illiteracy or lack of education. Take, for example, the Sierra
Leonean witness, who described himself as just “a primitive man
from the bush,”62 or the Timorese witness, who observed that he
“might have known the right words” if he had attended school,63
among many similar witnesses.64 Other witnesses maintained that
61. Id. at 44.
62. Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript, at 25
(June 16, 2004).
63. Los Palos Case Notes, July 27, 2001, at 83.
64. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript, at
5976 (Mar. 13, 2008) (quoting a witness that stated during trial, “I told them that
I am not a learned—I’m not educated”); Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No.
SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript, at 74 (June 21, 2004) [hereinafter Fofana Transcript,
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they could not estimate distances because they had never learned
units of measurement,65 and they could not identify locations or
landmarks on a map or sketch because they had never been asked
June 21, 2004] (transcribing a witness stating, “I’m not learned so I didn’t record
it. Those who are learned, you know, those are the people who record things on
paper, but I am not learned”); Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16T, Transcript, at 34 (Apr. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Brima Transcript, Apr. 8, 2005] (“I
do not know types of guns and I have not been to school. How would I be able to
know these names.”); Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T,
Transcript, at 21, 36 (June 28, 2005) (quoting a witness claiming that he did not
understand writing he observed due to his lack of education); Prosecutor v. Brima
et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, at 51 (July 14, 2005) [hereinafter
Brima Transcript, July 14, 2005] (“I can’t recall because I am not literate, I can’t
write. In fact, when the night comes and the day comes I can’t count anything.
Since I was born I have never been to school. I know nothing.”); Prosecutor v.
Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71, Transcript, at 10 (Sept. 15, 2003) (“You
know, I’m a peasant, I’m a farmer, so in my conditions I wouldn’t be able to give
you the models of or makes of cars.”); Lolotoe Case Notes, Apr. 9, 2002, at 4; Los
Palos Case Notes, July 12, 2001, at 18; id., July 23, 2001, at 55; id., July 27, 2001,
at 83; id., July 16, 2001, at 25; id., Aug. 9, 2001, at 142, 143; id., Aug. 21, 2001, at
179; id., Aug. 22, 2001, at 192; id., Jan. 10, 2001, at 319.
65. See Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71, Transcript, at
22 (Sept. 29, 2003) (“I cannot give the distance in terms of kilometres because I
haven’t been to school.”); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T,
Transcript, at 25 (Oct. 24, 1997) (responding that, when asked the distance to a
nearby river, “I do not know. That would be known by somebody who has been to
school”); Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Transcript, at 29 (July
19, 2001) (“I have already told you that I am not in a position to estimate, say, in
terms of metres. I am talking about metres, but I don’t really know what that
represents.”); Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, at
31 (Mar. 8, 2005) (“Q. How long does it take you to walk one mile? A. I’ve never
walked that mile, never. I don’t know.”); Prosecutor v. Karera, Case No. ICTR-0174-T, Judgement, ¶ 296 (Dec. 7, 2007) [hereinafter Karera Judgment]
(summarizing testimony in which witness maintains that he does not understand
the metric system and can estimate only by “paces”); Los Palos Case Notes, July
27, 2001, at 84 (“I don’t know what 100 meters is, I only found out when a
journalist told me.”); Los Palos Case Notes, July 30, 2001, at 94 (“I really don’t
know about meters.”); Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71,
Transcript, at 22–23 (Sept. 16, 2003) (“I am an ordinary person, so how do you
want me to measure in metres? Maybe you should better put that question to
somebody who is an agronomist.”); see also Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL03-01-T, Transcript, at 7620 (Apr. 15, 2008) (featuring a witness who was unable
to estimate distance by means of football fields); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No.
SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript, at 7738–39 (Apr. 16, 2008) (featuring a witness who
was unable to estimate distance by units of measurement). Whereas distance
estimations frequently proved challenging for ICTR, SCSL and SPSC witnesses,
a cursory look at ICTY transcripts suggests that it did not bedevil that Tribunal’s
witnesses to nearly the same degree. See, e.g., Prosecution v. Lukić, Case No. IT98-32/1, Transcript, at 305, 348 (July 10, 2008) (estimating distances in meters).
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to do so before.66 Given that Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and East Timor
had low literacy and education rates, particularly when their mass
atrocities occurred,67 these explanations seem plausible. Witnesses
from the countries of the former Yugoslavia, by contrast, were
dramatically more likely to be literate and to have completed
primary and secondary schools.68 Consequently, it is not surprising
that they were more often able to convey to the ICTY the kinds of
basic factual information that ICTR, SCSL, and Special Panels’
witnesses sometimes failed to provide.
It goes without saying that the failure to provide such
information impairs a court’s ability to find accurate facts. In
previous scholarship, I have identified the specific kinds of
fact-finding challenges that arise when questions involving
dates,69 distances,70 and physical locations71 go unanswered. These
difficulties have an especially negative impact on a defendant’s
ability to contest the charges against him. As I have observed
elsewhere:
A vague account devoid of details is an account that cannot be
effectively challenged. When a witness cannot date the events
she witnessed, the witness prevents the defendant from
presenting an alibi. When a witness cannot name the make of
the defendant’s car, then the witness’s account cannot be
66. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-T,
Transcript, at 130 (Feb. 13, 2002).
67. Sierra Leone’s literacy rate in 2000 was just 31%, CENT. INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2000), and East Timor’s in 2001 was 38%,
Timor-Leste, UNESCO INST. FOR STATS., http://uis.unesco.org/en/ country/TL (last
visited Jan. 22, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Just
before the genocide, in 1991, Rwanda’s literacy rate was 58%, Rwanda, UNESCO
INST. FOR STATS., https://en.unesco.org/countries/ rwanda (last visited Jan. 22,
2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In 1997, approximately
24% of Rwandans had completed primary school, U.N. DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999: RWANDA 33 (1999),
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/260/hdr_ 1999_en_nostats.pdf.
68. In 1994, the literacy rate in the former Yugoslavia was 90%, CENT.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK (1994), and about five years after the
war ended, Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia all had literacy rates of between 96 and
98 percent, Background Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE ARCHIVE
(2009), https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2868.htm (last visited Feb. 17,
2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
69. FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 27.
70. Id. at 33.
71. Id. at 37–38.
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undermined by evidence showing that the defendant drove a car
of a different make. When a witness is unable to say for how
long the rebels occupied his village, then the witness’s
testimony cannot be inconsistent with that of another witness
who might estimate a shorter or longer occupation. And when a
witness professes not to understand maps or photographs, the
witness renders the defense unable to prove that she was never
even at the scene of the crime. In other words, all manner of
innocent inaccuracies as well as deliberate lies can be concealed
through a witness’s plausible claim that he is unable to answer
a question.72

III. The Size, Scope, and Legal Characterization of the Crime
The previous Part revealed that the location of the crimes has
important evidentiary implications for mass atrocity prosecutions.
Specifically, prosecutions of mass atrocities in developing nations
must rely more heavily on testimonial evidence, which itself
renders the resulting fact-finding less reliable.73 In addition, the
testimonial evidence in those trials tends to be somewhat less
informative than testimonial evidence regarding crimes
perpetrated in developed nations.74 Location, therefore, is a highly
relevant factor driving international criminal law’s epistemic
challenges. But it is not the only factor. If it were, then
prosecutions of domestic crimes in developing nations would
feature fact-finding impediments similar to those appearing in
mass atrocity prosecutions.75 To be sure, prosecutors of domestic
crimes in developing countries do face many challenges, but the

72. Id. at 44.
73. Supra note 52 and accompanying text.
74. Supra note 64 and accompanying text.
75. I have not found descriptions of such difficulties in the literature and
have no reason to think that they exist.
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most notable appear to stem from lack of funding, lack of security,
and corruption,76 rather than from evidentiary deficiencies.77
For that reason, this Part explores a second significant factor
that drives fact-finding challenges in mass atrocity prosecutions,
namely the nature of the crimes being prosecuted. Subpart A
describes the way in which the large size and scope of mass atrocity
crimes gives rise to substantial evidentiary difficulties whereas
subpart B considers the impact of the legal characterization of
mass atrocities as international or domestic crimes.
A. Size Matters: The Fact-Finding Implications of Large-Scale
Criminality
Mass atrocity prosecutions, by definition, involve large-scale
criminality; that is, they involve crimes that take place in the
context of hundreds or thousands of other similar crimes.78 Finding
accurate facts about crimes that are embedded in large-scale
criminality is more difficult than finding accurate facts about
discrete, isolated crimes. On the one hand, this conclusion may
seem obvious; that is, it goes without saying that a crime involving
100 victims presents a more complex (and probably more
uncertain) evidentiary picture than a crime involving one victim.
76. See MOHAMED SUMA, SIERRA LEONE: JUSTICE SECTOR AND THE RULE OF
LAW
103–04
(2014),
http://issat.dcaf.ch/download/48039/758786/Sierra%
20Leone%20Justice.pdf (discussing lack of interpreters and delays); 1 CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT AROUND THE WORLD 4 (Graeme R. Newman et al. eds., 2011) (finding
that most rape cases in Angola “never reach prosecution stage because of limited
investigative resources, low level forensic capabilities, and an ineffective judicial
system”); id. at 35–36, 39 (detailing challenges facing the criminal justice system
of Central African Republic, such as vigilante justice that results from the
population’s lack of confidence in law enforcement and the judiciary); CTR. FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY & THE RULE OF LAW, HARROWING TRIALS: TIME TO BRING CLOSURE
ON PROLONGED TRIALS FOR ACCUSED PERSONS IN SIERRA LEONE’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 4–5 (2015) (calling on the state to “provide more resources to the justice
system, particularly the judiciary to be able to carry out its functions effectively
and efficiently”).
77. But see SUMA, supra note 76, at 82, 104, 106 (discussing the implications
of witness intimidation, inadequate witness protection mechanisms, and the
burdens that inefficient Preliminary Investigation imposes on travelling
witnesses in Sierra Leone).
78. See Whiting, supra note 27, at 335 (“Sometimes war crimes occur in
isolation, but generally they occur systematically or on a mass scale, either in the
context of armed conflict or the disintegration of society.”).
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But the enhanced fact-finding challenges involved in
prosecuting mass atrocities extend far beyond that self-evident
fact. In particular, most mass atrocities occur within certain
contexts and display certain features, and it is these contexts and
features that create many fact-finding challenges. What are these
facts and features? First, mass atrocities usually take place either
during an armed conflict or, if in peacetime, then at the hands of a
repressive government. Second, mass atrocities usually are
perpetrated by large numbers of offenders. Sections 1 and 2 will
address these features in turn. In doing so, they highlight the
enhanced fact-finding challenges that attend mass atrocity
prosecutions as compared to prosecutions of isolated crimes.
Section 3 will show how the fact-finding obstacles resulting from
these contextual features combine with the location-based
obstacles identified in Part I to create unique, additional
impediments to accurate fact-finding. Finally, section 4 will
explore the different fact-finding challenges that attend mass
atrocities of different sizes and scopes.
1. The Context Surrounding Mass Atrocities: Armed Conflicts,
Obstructionist Governments, and Evidentiary Implications
Mass atrocities occur during armed conflicts or as components
of large-scale human rights violations. As a consequence, those
who investigate mass atrocities frequently confront three obstacles
that subsequently cause fact-finding uncertainty at trial:
governmental interference with investigations, inadequate
security in the region, and delay-induced destruction and
degradation of evidence. The impact of the latter two factors
depends largely on the timing of the prosecutions, which I will
discuss in subsection a. Specifically, prosecutions can be
undertaken while the conflict is still underway or while
perpetrators or other parties who have a stake in the prosecutions
remain in power. Alternatively, prosecutions can be delayed until
the conflict has ended or a regime change has put the authors of
the atrocities out of power. Each option leads to unique fact-finding
challenges, as this section will detail. The third obstacle—
governmental interference with investigations—frequently
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transcends the timing of the prosecutions, so it will be considered
in subsection b.
a. Now or Later: The Dangers of Contemporaneous Prosecutions
Versus the Losses Incurred by Delayed Prosecutions
As noted, mass atrocities generally take place in the context of
an armed conflict or some other large-scale societal rupture. When
prosecutors or defense counsel seek to investigate the crimes
before the region has stabilized, they typically find it difficult to
obtain high-quality evidence. Investigators may not be able to
travel to crime sites at all.79 When ICC investigators first began
their investigations into crimes in the DRC, they could not visit the
eastern part of the country due to security concerns,80 and early
ICC investigations in Libya were similarly impeded.81 Even when
the instability is not so grave as to entirely prevent investigations,
it can impede forensic activities82 and deter potential witnesses
79. See BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, supra note 49, at 6 (highlighting the
“operational challenges” of the timely collection of evidence after an atrocity,
“including the need to balance security risks with the need for timely evidence
collection”); DIGITAL FINGERPRINTS, supra note 35, at 3 (“In the aftermath of
atrocities, investigators may be restricted from collecting evidence because of
ongoing violence or an inability to access crime scenes.”); Peggy O’Donnell, Using
Scientific Evidence to Advance Prosecutions at the International Criminal Court
10 (unpublished workshop paper) (on file with author) (describing the security
assessment the ICC undertakes to determine whether to send investigators to a
crime site). Obviously, when investigators are unable to visit the crime sites, they
will be unable to discover certain forensic evidence or to interview local witnesses.
See Whiting, supra note 27, at 335–36 (noting that lack of access to crime scenes
after an atrocity is one of the major logistical challenges that prosecutors must
overcome to bring charges against perpetrators). See generally CHRIS MAHONY,
THE JUSTICE SECTOR AFTERTHOUGHT: WITNESS PROTECTION IN AFRICA (2010).
80. See Caroline Buisman, Delegating Investigations: Lessons to be Learned
from the Lubanga Judgment, 11 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 30, 41–42 (2013).
81. See OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, ELEVENTH
REPORT OF THE PROSECUTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT TO THE
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PURSUANT TO UNSCR 1970 (2011), ¶ 11 (May
26, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/otp_report_lib_26052016eng.pdf (“The Office underscores that due to the prevailing instability and current
security situation, it is impossible for investigators to undertake investigative
activities in Libya.”).
82. See JEAN M. MORGAN, PROVING GENOCIDE: THE ROLE OF FORENSIC
ANTHROPOLOGY IN DEVELOPING EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR
GENOCIDE 14–15 (2011) (unpublished thesis, Florida State University) (on file
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from talking to investigators.83 In certain situations, for instance,
the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor has had to go to extraordinary
lengths to approach potential witnesses without exposing them.
These efforts have included “identify[ing] safe sites for interviews;
secur[ing] discreet transportation for investigators and witnesses;
provid[ing] for the contingency of moving witnesses to safe
locations without attracting attention; and even check[ing] the
relationships of drivers and hotel owners with the suspects.”84 As
one ICC prosecutor put it:
Secret locations had to be found to interview individuals.
International officials, whether white or black people, coming
into certain areas were immediately identified as outsiders.
This had major consequences for the quality of the evidence
because those who were willing to be interviewed were not
necessarily the best witnesses. Even those who might be willing
to speak at first later change their mind when they realize who
has been charged. People who are outside this institution
looking at this say, “Ok, let’s charge Gaddafi, it’s easy, it’s
obvious.” But who is going to be willing to come and testify
against Gaddafi if their car could blow up while coming?85

with the Florida State University Libraries), https://fsu.digital.flvc.org/
islandora/object/fsu:183025/datastream/PDF (describing the government’s
placing of booby traps and mines around mass graves so as to prevent
excavations).
83. See, e.g., SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEB., SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 25–26
(2010–11),
https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/documents/president-s-reports-andmemoranda/227-Second-Annual-Report-2010-2011
There has been intimidation of witnesses in a number of ways:
commencing in the last quarter of 2010, several calls have been made
for a boycott of the Tribunal; public threats have been made to dissuade
cooperation with the Tribunal; and unlawful broadcasts of audio
recordings of witness interviews made in confidence to the UN
International Independent Investigation Commission have been aired
on some Lebanese television channels.
84. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, REPORT ON THE
ACTIVITIES PERFORMED DURING THE FIRST THREE YEARS (JUNE 2003–JUNE 2006),
at 7 (Sept. 12, 2006), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D76A5D89-FB6447A9-9821-725747 378AB2/143680/OTP_3yearreport20060914_English.pdf.
85. John D. Jackson & Yassin M. Brunger, Fragmentation and
Harmonization in the Development of Evidentiary Practices in International
Criminal Tribunals, in PLURALISM IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note
50, at 159, 171 (citation omitted).
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Prosecutors in other international tribunals have faced similar
challenges.86 Constrained investigations frequently generate
sub-par evidence that subsequently creates fact-finding
uncertainty during trials. Evidence and witnesses who should
appear often do not, and those who do may not be the most
probative. Such difficulties were on full display in the ICC’s first
case—Prosecutor v. Lubanga87—which featured a Congolese
defendant accused of enlisting and conscripting child soldiers.88
Prosecutors determined that prospective Congolese witnesses
would be endangered if even interviewed by ICC employees,89 so
they
instead
enlisted
local
persons—denominated
intermediaries—to act as liaisons between potential witnesses and
the ICC.90 It was intermediaries, then, who selected and
interviewed the individuals who later appeared as witnesses at
trial.91 Although the prosecution’s use of intermediaries may have
been well-intentioned, it backfired spectacularly. Nine witnesses
who claimed to have been child soldiers testified, yet the Trial
Chamber did not credit or rely on a single one of them.92 The very
first prosecution witness recanted his testimony, claiming that an
intermediary had instructed him to provide a false account,93 and
several subsequent witnesses made similar allegations.94 In the
end, the Trial Chamber rejected virtually all of the evidence
provided by intermediaries and harshly criticized the prosecution
for their use.95 Although the Trial Chamber’s criticism may have
86. See MAHONY, supra note 79, at 72–75 (discussing challenges facing ICTR
prosecutors).
87. Lubanga Judgment, supra note 22, ¶¶ 269–283.
88. See id.
89. See O’Donnell, supra note 79, at 11–13.
90. See Buisman, supra note 80, at 34–35.
91. See id. at 35.
92. See Lubanga Judgment, supra note 22, ¶ 479 (recognizing “the trauma
the children called by the prosecution are likely to have suffered” but finding them
“unreliable as regard the matters that are relevant to the charges in this case”).
93. See id. ¶¶ 330, 430, 449.
94. See Buisman, supra note 80, at 44.
95. See id. at 32 (“The judgment is scathing about the investigative failures
of the Prosecutor and particularly the excessive reliance on these
intermediaries.”); Lubanga Judgment, supra note 22, ¶ 482 (“The Chamber is of
the view that the prosecution should not have delegated its investigative
responsibilities to the intermediaries . . . .”).
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been justified, one cannot deny that it was the unstable security
situation in the Eastern DRC that prompted the prosecution’s
employment of intermediaries in the first place.96
Because on-going conflicts render investigations so difficult to
conduct, mass atrocity investigations are commonly delayed until
the conflict ends and the region stabilizes.97 Such delays reduce the
kinds of evidentiary difficulties just described, but they give rise to
other evidentiary difficulties. For instance, time lags give
perpetrators an opportunity to destroy evidence or conceal it,98 and
many perpetrators have made use of this opportunity over the
years. The Japanese destroyed documents in anticipation of the
Tokyo Tribunal trial,99 the Khmer Rouge destroyed documents as
96. See Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3394-Red, Defence
Observations following the Décision relative aux requêtes présentées par la
Défense dans ses observations 3379 et 3386 des 3 et 17 juin 2013, ¶ 15 (Aug. 5,
2013) https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/katanga/Documents/KatangaEng.pdf (noting
that even in 2013, “current, extreme security difficulties pertaining in Ituri and
North Kivu render[] investigations either extremely difficult or impossible to
conduct”).
97. See Mike P.J. Cole, Investigating Military Operations: Added Value or
Added Hype?, 212 MIL. L. REV. 194, 207 (2012) (noting, among other things, that
“witnesses become more willing to speak when it is clear that the previous
government will not return”). To be sure, evidence gathering can be fraught with
difficulty even when the conflict has unquestionably ended and the ruling party
unquestionably supports prosecutions. Rwanda was in this comparatively
favorable position following the 1994 genocide; nonetheless, many potential
Rwandan witnesses were afraid to speak with investigators, and virtually all who
testified at the ICTR did so using pseudonyms. See Sluiter, supra note 48, at 967,
976 (explaining the need for witness protection). The fears of ICTR witnesses were
well-founded. See Second Annual Report of the ICTR, ¶ 51, U.N. Docs. A/52/582
and S/1997/868 (Dec. 2, 1997) (reporting on the murders of scores of ICTR
witnesses); PAUL MAGNARELLA, JUSTICE IN AFRICA: RWANDA’S GENOCIDE, ITS
COURTS AND THE UN CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 74 (2000) (same).
98. Whiting, supra note 27, at 336.
99. The Japanese War Ministry ordered the burning of all inculpatory
documents in the possession of its troops. See Yuma Totani, The Case Against the
Accused, in BEYOND VICTOR’S JUSTICE? THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL REVISITED
147, 154–55 (Yuki Tanaka et al. eds., 2011); see also ARNOLD C. BRACKMAN, THE
OTHER NUREMBERG 40 (1987) (noting that Japanese militarists destroyed
inculpatory documents “by the warehouseful”); PHILIP R. PICCIGALLO, THE
JAPANESE ON TRIAL: ALLIED WAR CRIMES OPERATIONS IN THE EAST, 1945–1951, at
10 (1980) (“Rapid demobilization and repatriation of ex-POWs, witnesses and
evidence scattered literally throughout the world, wholesale destruction of key
documents by Japanese, incredible difficulties in identifying, locating and
apprehending suspects in Japan proper and East Asia and other factors combined
to render nearly impossible the tasks given to Allied prosecutors.”).
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Cambodia was being overrun by Vietnamese troops,100 and the
Serbs, though not able entirely to destroy evidence of the
Srebrenica massacres, did conceal a great deal of it by burying the
victims in secret mass graves and repeatedly moving the remains
from one grave to another.101 Evidence also disappears for innocent
reasons as time passes. In the ordinary course of time, witnesses
die, documents are lost, and various forms of forensic evidence can
lose their probative value.102
Delaying prosecutions can also undermine the quality of the
evidence that is discovered. For one thing, research shows what we
all know, that memories fade over time,103 so testimony about
long-ago events is less likely to be accurate than testimony about
recent events. The international tribunals have repeatedly
recognized this fact and found deficiencies and inconsistencies in
witness testimony attributable to the lengthy delay between the
events in question and testimony about those events.104 The
100. See CRAIG ETCHESON, AFTER THE KILLING FIELDS: LESSONS FROM THE
CAMBODIAN GENOCIDE 64–65 (2005).
101. See Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 382–
383 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005),
https://web.archive.org/web/20070310174358/http://www.un.org/icty/blagojevic/t
rialc/judgement/index.htm (“The Trial Chamber is also of the opinion that the
opening of the mass graves and the reburial of the victims in other locations was
an attempt to conceal the evidence of the mass killings.”); see also Zekerija
Mujkanović, The Orientation Criteria Document in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in
CRITERIA FOR PRIORITIZING AND SELECTING CORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CASES
79, 80 (Morton Bergsmo ed., 2d ed. 2010) (reporting that “complete archive
materials were secretly carried out of” Bosnia).
102. See ETCHESON, supra note 100, at 64–65 (describing the destruction of
forensic evidence in Cambodia); Whiting, supra note 27, at 332 (explaining causes
of “degradation of evidence”); Witteveen, supra note 7, at 388 (“The time lapse
between the moment of the occurrence of the facts and crimes, and the actual
investigations and trials has consequences. . . . [E]vidence will have been lost.”).
103. See JOHN W. SHEPHERD ET AL., IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION 80–86 (1982) (describing authors’ study showing that
memory remained relatively constant for a few months after an event but declined
sharply after eleven months); Hadyn D. Ellis, Practical Aspects of Face Memory,
in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 12, 23–25 (Gary L.
Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus eds., 1984) (summarizing research). But see
Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06-T-84-ENG, Transcript, at 23
(Apr. 18, 2016) [hereinafter Ntaganda Transcript, Apr. 18, 2016] (providing
expert witness Dr. John Charles Yuille’s description of the hypermnesia of some
trauma victims who repeatedly relive their traumatic experiences and thereby
retain strong memories of them).
104. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tENG, Judgment
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probative value of forensic evidence can also decline over time.105
A mass grave that is examined a decade after the atrocity, for
instance, typically will reveal less probative evidence than a mass
grave that is examined three months after the atrocity.106 As this
pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 49 (Dec. 18, 2012), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013_02993.PDF [hereinafter Ngudjolo Judgment]
(providing examples of witness recollection issues due to delay between the event
being testified about and the trial); Lubanga Judgment, supra note 22, ¶ 103
(same); Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-T, Judgment and
Sentence, ¶ 65 (Apr. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Muhimana Judgment] (same);
Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-01-64-T, Judgement, ¶ 83 (June 17,
2004) [hereinafter Gacumbitsi Judgment] (same); Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No.
IT-03-66-T, Judgement, ¶ 12 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30,
2005) (“The Chamber further observes that the seven years that have passed
since the events in the Indictment have, in all likelihood, affected the accuracy
and reliability of the memories of witnesses, understandably so.”); Prosecutor v.
Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14J, Separate Concurring and Partially
Dissenting Opinion of Hon. Justice Bankole Thompson Filed Pursuant to Article
18 of the Statute, ¶ 44 (Aug. 2, 2007) (“The Chamber duly advised itself that
evidence about facts which took place 10 or more years prior to testifying may
well involve inherent uncertainties due to the imperfections and vagaries of
human perception and recollection.”).
105. See BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, supra note 49, at 6 (stating that experts
“stressed that arriving as early as possible at crime scenes and collecting evidence
promptly can help ensure that evidence is not tampered with, degraded, or
destroyed”); O’Donnell, supra note 79, at 16–17 (describing the way in which
investigative delays impeded investigators’ ability to obtain probative forensic
evidence in the Lubanga case). Different types of forensic evidence will degrade
over differing timelines. For example, DNA evidence will become severely
damaged, as a result of exposure to environmental effects such as temperature
extremes, humidity, or microbial activity, over the course of thirty or forty years.
See Lisa Lane Schade & Leonard Klevan, Identifying Degraded DNA, FORENSIC
MAG. (Jan. 2, 2007, 3:00 AM), https://www.forensicmag.com/article/2007/
01/identifying-degraded-dna (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). At the other end of the spectrum, fresh
fingerprints might last only eight hours before deteriorating. JOSEPH J. VINCE &
WILLIAM E. SHERLOCK, EVIDENCE COLLECTION 45 (2005).
106. See ETCHESON, supra note 100, at 65–66 (describing the way in which
“[m]ass graves are particularly vulnerable to destruction both by humans and the
environment”); see also Shaoni Bhattacharya, Vital Evidence Lost from Iraq’s
Mass Graves, NEW SCIENTIST (May 14, 2003), https://www.newscientist.com/
article/dn3733-vital-evidence-lost-from-iraqs-mass-graves/ (last visited Jan. 22,
2018) (“‘Once bodies have been buried, there is a certain amount of decomposition
but then the environment stabilises . . . . But when people have been digging and
exposing the grave to the air, ‘you get a resumption of decay.’”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Iraq: Protect Mass Graves, HUM. RIGHTS
WATCH (Jan. 30, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/30/iraqprotect-mass-graves (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (“Exhumations without forensic
experts can destroy critical evidence . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
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discussion shows, then, the context of conflict and instability that
surrounds mass atrocities creates unique and often severe
fact-finding challenges for those later seeking to prosecute or
defend their alleged perpetrators.
b. Governmental Interference in Prosecutions
Because most mass atrocities are embedded in large-scale
conflicts involving governmental officials, the prosecutions of mass
atrocities frequently give rise to governmental interference. In
some cases, governmental authorities flat-out prevent
investigations: Burundi, for instance, has denied the ICC access to
its territory since the ICC’s Prosecutor opened a preliminary
investigation in April 2016.107 President al Bashir of Sudan
likewise prevented the ICC from conducting in-state investigations
in Darfur,108 and his obstructionism eventually led ICC
prosecutors to suspend investigations entirely.109 Other
governments interfere to support prosecutions and convictions.
The Government of Rwanda, for instance, allegedly prevented
ICTR defense counsel from entering Rwanda;110 similarly, in 2012,
Law Review); Morgan, supra note 82, at 67–68 (explaining probative value of
forensic evidence in mass atrocities).
107. Jane E. Stromseth, Assessing the International Criminal Court, at 12
(unpublished draft) (on file with author); see also Burundi Warns Against
Execution Investigations at ICC, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE (Mar. 30, 2016),
https://www.yahoo.com/news/burundi-warns-against-execution-investigationsicc-105538473.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2018) (warning victims of extrajudicial
executions not to provide evidence to the ICC) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
108. See Göran Sluiter, Responding to Cooperation Problems at the STL, in
THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON 134, 148–49 (Amal Alumuddin et al. eds.,
2014) (explaining that investigations in Darfur are “practically impossible”
because Sudan’s government refuses to cooperate). Sudan, indeed, has made
cooperating with the ICC a criminal offense. See Prosecutor v. Banda, ICC-02/0503/09-274, Defense Request for a Temporary Stay of Proceedings, ¶ 2 (Jan. 6,
2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_00037.PDF.
109. See David Smith, ICC Chief Prosecutor Shelves Darfur War Crimes
Probe, GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
dec/14/icc-darfur-war-crimes-fatou-bensouda-sudan (last visited Jan. 22, 2018)
(discussing circumstances prompting suspension of the ICC’s investigation in
Darfur) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
110. See generally Thierry Cruvellier, Grass-Roots Justice¸ INT’L JUST. TRIB.,
Mar. 29, 1999. See also Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-T, Judgement
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when ICC defense counsel to Libyan defendant Saif al-Islam
travelled to Zintan, Libya to interview her client, she was arrested
by Libyan authorities and detained for several weeks.111
Even when government officials do not close the borders to
investigators or physically bar their access to witnesses, they can
prevent probative evidence from reaching the courtroom. ICC
investigators, for instance, were able to acquire sufficient evidence
to convince the court’s Pre-Trial Chamber to confirm charges
against Kenyan President Kenyatta112 and Vice President Ruto,113
but thereafter the defendants or their associates allegedly
intimidated prospective witnesses to such a degree that a large
proportion of them recanted their inculpatory statements.114 As a
and Sentence, ¶¶ 41–43 (Dec. 13, 2005); Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR98-41-T, Decision on Motion Concerning Alleged Witness Intimidation, ¶ 1 (Dec.
28, 2004) (alleging intimidation prevented defence counsel from fact finding); Kai
Ambos, International Criminal Procedure: “Adversarial,” “Inquisitorial” or
Mixed?, 3 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 1, 36 (2003) (“There are various cases where defence
counsel were denied permission to enter the territory of . . . Rwanda.”); Frederik
Harhoff, The Role of the Parties Before International Criminal Courts in Light of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in INTERNATIONAL AND
NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 645, 655–56 (Horst
Fischer et al. eds., 2001) (“Defence Counsels were flatly denied permission to
enter into Rwanda . . . .”); Steven Kay & Bert Swart, The Role of the Defence, in
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1421, 1424 (Antonio
Cassese et al. eds., 2002) (observing that Rwanda obstructs defense counsel’s
access to the State).
111. See Marlise Simons, Libya Refuses to Release Hague Court Workers, N.Y.
TIMES (June 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/world/africa/libyarefuses-to-release-hague-staff-in-custody.html?_r=0 (last visited Jan. 22, 2018)
(discussing the arrest of Melinda Taylor and other ICC attorneys) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Libya ICC Lawyer Melinda Taylor and
Colleagues Fly Out, BBC NEWS (July 3, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-18683786 (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
112. See Prosecutor v. Muthaura, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute,
¶ 428 (Jan. 23, 2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_01006.PDF.
113. See Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-373, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute,
¶ 302 (Jan. 23, 2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_01004.PDF.
114. See Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-1866-Red, Public redacted
version of “Prosecution’s request for the admission of prior recorded testimony of
[REDACTED] witnesses,” 29 April 2015, ICC-01/09-01/11-1866-Conf + Annexes,
¶ 2 (May 21, 2015); Press Release, Kenya Human Rights Comm’n, Kenya:
Termination of Ruto and Sang case at the ICC: Witness Tampering Means
Impunity Prevails over Justice Again (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.khrc.or.ke/2015-
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consequence of these witness defections, an ICC Trial Chamber
acquitted Ruto,115 and the prosecution withdrew its case against
Kenyatta for lack of evidence.116 These examples and many others
show that governmental authorities have the power to
dramatically impact the quantity and quality of evidence available
in a mass atrocity prosecution, and they commonly make use of
that power.
2. Fact-Finding Challenges Caused by Group Criminality
The previous section highlighted the conditions of conflict that
surround most mass atrocities, and it considered the evidentiary
implications of those conditions. Another important contextual
factor, one that this section will take up, relates to the perpetrators
of mass atrocities. Specifically, mass atrocities are typically
perpetrated by massive numbers of individuals, but in most cases,
only a small proportion of those individuals can be prosecuted.
That fact alone does not create evidentiary difficulties; indeed, few
fact-finding challenges would arise if prosecutors targeted their
limited number of prosecutions against those for whom there was
the greatest evidence of criminality. But usually—and
understandably—they do not. Rather, prosecutors typically target
the high-level government and military officials who orchestrated
the atrocities, and they leave unprosecuted the individuals who
03-04-10-37-01/press-releases/528-kenya-termination-of-ruto-and-sang-case-at-the
icc-witness-tampering-means-impunity-prevkenya-termination-of-ruto-and-sangcase-at-the-icc-witnesstampering-means-impunity-prevails-over-justice-again.html
(last visited Feb. 17, 2018) (“[T]he Prosecutor sought to admit the
testimonies . . . [because] a number of witnesses, after giving their initial
testimony, stopped cooperating due to threats . . . .”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Tom Maliti, Prosecutor Withdraws Seven Witnesses in
Kenyatta Case in Past Year, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (Jan. 16, 2014),
http://www.ijmonitor.org/2014/01/prosecutor-withdraws-seven-witnesses-inkenyatta- case-in-past-year/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (explaining circumstances
surrounding witnesses’ removal) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
115. See Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-2027-Red-Corr, Public Redacted
Version of: Decision on Defence Applications for Judgments of Acquittal, ¶ 464
(Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_04384.PDF.
116. See Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11-983, Notice of withdrawal
of the charges against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, ¶ 2 (Dec. 5, 2014),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_09939.PDF.
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actually carried out the offenses.117 This sort of targeting makes
good sense both from a political standpoint as well as a penological
standpoint,118 but it also creates a great deal of uncertainty at trial.
Domestic prosecutors have long found it difficult to obtain
good quality evidence against leaders of large criminal networks,
such as organized crime syndicates or drug cartels,119 and that
same difficulty arises and creates tremendous uncertainty in trials
of mass atrocity leaders. Some of the uncertainty stems from the
fact that the evidence available to prove the criminal liability of
high-level offenders is generally weaker and less certain than the
evidence available to prove the criminal liability of direct
perpetrators.120 Consider, for instance, forensic evidence. Even in
developing nations, where less non-testimonial evidence exists,
those prosecuting isolated, domestic murders frequently rely on
forensic evidence to identify perpetrators and prove their criminal
liability.121 Section 1 just revealed that such forensic evidence
117. See generally MARIA NYSTEDT ET AL., A HANDBOOK ON ASSISTING
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 43 (2011); Alexander K.A. Greenawalt,
Justice Without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the International Criminal
Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 583, 627 (2007). ICTY prosecutors initially
targeted lower-level offenders in an effort to build cases against more senior
officials, but tribunal judges successfully opposed that strategy. See Claudia
Angermaier, Case Selection and Prioritization Criteria in the Work of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in CRITERIA FOR
PRIORITIZING AND SELECTING CORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CASES 27, 29–31
(Morton Bergsmo ed., 2d ed. 2010) (observing that prosecutors prioritize
indictment of high-level officials over those actually carrying out the crimes).
118. See Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations:
Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of
International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 149 (2005) (discussing benefits of
the “command responsibility doctrine”).
119. See generally Lauren Ouziel, Ambition and Fruition in Federal Criminal
Law: A Case Study, 103 VA. L. REV. 1077 (2017); Spencer Martinez, Note,
Bargaining for Testimony: Bias of Witnesses Who Testify in Exchange for
Leniency, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 141, 142 (1999).
120. Whiting, supra note 27, at 339.
121. See, e.g., Uganda v. Engonu, HCCC No. 29 of 2012 (Uganda) (June 8,
2015), http://www.ulii.org/ug/judgment/hc-criminal-division/2015/18/; Uganda v.
Mukalu,
HCCC
No.
86
of
2013
(Uganda)
(Mar.
9,
2015),
http://www.ulii.org/ug/judgment/high-court-criminal-division/2015/2; Uganda v.
Okello et al. (Criminal Session Case No. 100 of 2012.) [2015] UGHCCRD 5
(Uganda) (May 26, 2015), http://www.ulii.org/ug/judgment/hc-criminaldivision/2015/5; Nyander v. RL, [2011] LRSC 9 (Liberia) (Jan. 21, 2011),
http://www.liberlii.org/cgi-bin/disp.pl/lr/cases/LRSC/2011/9.html?stem=0&
synonyms=0&query=murder; Fartoma v. RL, [2011] LRSC 7 (Liberia) (Jan. 20,
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might not be available in mass atrocity prosecutions if
prosecutions are delayed for years or decades. But even when
forensic evidence of a mass atrocity does exist, it frequently has
little probative value.
It has little probative value because it does not answer the
questions that most mass atrocity prosecutions seek to answer.
That is, forensic evidence of an isolated murder can help to identify
the person who killed the victim. Forensic evidence of a mass
killing might do the same, but because the direct perpetrators of
mass atrocities are rarely prosecuted, the forensic evidence is
usually far less important.122 To be sure, a mass grave will show
2011), http://www.liberlii.org/cgi-in/disp.pl/lr/cases/LRSC/2011/7.html?stem=0&
synonyms=0&query=murder; Williams v. RL, [2014] LRSC 45 (Liberia) (Aug. 15,
2014), http://www.liberlii.org/cgi-bin/disp.pl/lr/cases/LRSC/2014/ 45.html?stem=0
&synonyms=0&query=murder; Republic v. Mngulwi, [2003] TZHC 7 (Tanzania)
(May
2,
2003),
http://www.saflii.org/cgi-bin/disp.pl?file=tz/cases/TZHC/
2003/7.html&query=murder; Republic v. Maneno, [2005] TZHC 60 (Tanzania)
(Nov.
11,
2005),
http://www.saflii.org/cgi-bin/disp.pl?file=tz/cases/
TZHC/2005/60.html&query=murder; Republic v. Muasya, (2009) (H.C.K.)
(Kenya), http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/ view/97451/; Republic v. Kokane,
(2009) (H.C.K.) (Kenya), http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/104682/.
122. Because the Special Panels were able to apprehend only low-level
Timorese soldiers who actually perpetrated the crimes, they did make use of some
forensic evidence. See MOHAMED C. OTHMAN, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW VIOLATIONS: THE CASE OF RWANDA AND EAST TIMOR 106–07
(2005) (explaining that forensic evidence is useful for identifying victims);
Prosecution v. Tacaqui, Case No. 202001, Judgement, at 6 (Special Panels for
Serious Crimes, Dist. Court of Dili, Timor-Leste Dec. 9, 2004),
http://www.worldcourts.com/un_etta/eng/decisions/2004.12.09_Prosecutor_v_Tac
aqui.pdf (using forensic evidence to give “comprehensive picture of the case” at
trial rather than proving the accused’s wrongdoing); Prosecution v. Correia, Case
No. 272003, Judgement, at 7 (Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Dist. Court of
Dili, Timor-Leste Apr. 25, 2005), http://www.worldcourts.com/un_etta/
eng/decisions/2005.04.25_Prosecutor_v_Alves_Correia.pdf; Prosecution v.
Mesquita, Case No. 282003, Judgement, ¶ 43 (Special Panels for Serious Crimes,
Dist. Court of Dili, Timor-Leste June 12, 2004), http://www.worldcourts.
com/un_etta/eng/decisions/2004.12.06_Prosecutor_v_Mesquita.pdf. The ICTR, for
its part, abandoned its forensic program after only one mass excavation; although
the excavation exhumed the remains of nearly 500 individuals, only a handful of
these individuals could be identified. See Eric Stover & Rachel Shigekane,
Exhumation of Mass Graves: Balancing Legal and Humanitarian Needs, in MY
NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS
ATROCITY 85, 89 (Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein eds., 2004); see also Caroline
Buisman, The Prosecutor’s Obligation to Investigate Incriminating and
Exonerating Circumstances Equally: Illusion or Reality?, 27 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.
205, 211 (2014) [hereinafter Buisman, Prosecutor’s Obligation] (observing that in
Katanga “no proper exhumation was conducted to identify the number and causes
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that a large-scale killing took place, but that sort of fact is rarely
contested in mass atrocity trials.123 Forensic analysis can also show
that large numbers of victims were summarily executed,124 which
can suggest that the crimes were committed as part of a systematic
or coordinated attack.125 Certainly, these facts can suggest the
involvement of a military commander or a civilian leader.
However, because mass atrocity trials typically feature defendants
who have no physical link to the crime,126 forensic evidence will
usually be far less probative in such trials than in trials of isolated
criminality.127
Eyewitness testimony is also likely to be more problematic in
prosecutions of mass atrocities in general and prosecutions of
high-level offenders in particular. For one thing, whereas isolated
crimes are often perpetrated by individuals who are known to
victims,128 mass atrocities are more frequently perpetrated by
of deaths and the status (civilian or military) of the victims”).
123. See, e.g., Duch Judgment, supra note 49, ¶ 208 (noting that defendant
admitted that at least 12,273 people died or were executed at Tuol Sleng while he
commanded the prison camp); Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-02-78T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 561 (Nov. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Kanyarukiga
Judgment] (“It is not disputed that the Nyange Parish Church was destroyed on
16 April 1994 or that the Tutsi civilians who had taken refuge there were killed.”).
124. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment,
¶¶ 5217–5218 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2016),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf [hereinafter
Karadžić Judgment] (describing the cause of death for 150 individuals).
125. See, e.g., Krstić Judgment, supra note 52, ¶¶ 71–79 (finding that the
forensic evidence corroborated witness’s testimony of mass killings).
126. See Morten Bergsmo & William H. Wiley, Human Rights Professionals
and the Criminal Investigation and Prosecution of Core International Crimes, in
MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING: AN INTRODUCTION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
FIELD OFFICERS 11 (2008), http://www.jus.uio.no/smr/english/about/programmes/
nordem/publications/manual (“[I]nternational criminal jurisdictions . . . can be
expected to primarily pursue alleged perpetrators who were not physically
present when criminal conduct was committed.”).
127. See Whiting, supra note 27, at 338 (“With respect to linkage, the accused
commander is often far removed from the crimes and there are generally no
documents directly connecting him to the commission of those crimes.”).
128. In both developed and developing nations, violent crime is commonly
perpetrated by the victims’ friends and family members. A Bureau of Justice
Statistics study showed, for instance, that in 2010 in the United States, about
38% of non-fatal violent crimes were committed by strangers, compared to about
62% committed by non-strangers. See ERIKA HARRELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION COMMITTED BY
STRANGERS,
1993–2010,
at
1
(2012),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
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those who have no pre-existing relationships with their victims.
Thus, to the extent that the identity of perpetrators is relevant in
a mass-atrocity case, then fact-finders must rely on the most
questionable
evidence
of
all—stranger
eyewitness
identifications.129 In addition, when high-level offenders are
prosecuted, then the most probative witnesses are usually
insiders; that is, those who worked with the defendants to commit
the atrocities. Unlike unfamiliar victim witnesses, insider
witnesses have no difficulty identifying the defendant, but they
often do have incentives to falsely inculpate or exculpate him. To
be sure, the perjuring proclivities of insider witnesses also create
evidentiary challenges in trials of domestic crimes,130 so trials of
pdf/vvcs9310.pdf (providing statistics concerning relationship between homicide
victims and their killers). The study further found that between 1993 and 2008,
between 21% and 27% of homicides were committed by strangers, versus 73% to
79% by non-strangers. Id. The relative proportions can vary considerably
depending on the gender of the victim. In particular, women are far more likely
to be victimized by someone they know than are men. See OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF
CRIME, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, 2015 NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS WEEK
RESOURCE GUIDE 10 (2015), https://ovc.ncjrs.gov/ncvrw2015/pdf/FullGuide.pdf
In cases in 2012 where victims indicated their relationship to the
offender, males experienced aggravated assault by a nonstranger
(including intimate partner, other relative, and friend/acquaintance)
in 34.8 percent of cases and by a stranger in 53.0 percent. Females
experienced aggravated assault by a nonstranger in 52.4 percent of
cases and by a stranger in 37.9 percent of cases.
For similar statistics regarding Liberian crime, see SMALL ARMS SURVEY, ISSUE
BRIEF, READING BETWEEN THE LINES: CRIME AND VICTIMIZATION IN LIBERIA 2, 10
(2011), http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/G-Issue-briefs/LiberiaAVA-IB2.pdf.
129. See Gaetano Noël Best, Fair and Accurate Fact-Finding in Dutch
Atrocity Crimes Cases (Oct. 20, 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Amsterdam) (discussing the inherent unreliability of eyewitness evidence and
describing it as “regularly inaccurate, even if it has been gathered under the most
favourable of circumstances”) (on file with author).
130. See, e.g., Michael Cassidy, “Soft Words of Hope”: Giglio, Accomplice
Witnesses, and the Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1129, 1140
(2004) (“Not only do accomplice witnesses have a motive to fabricate, they have
an ability to fabricate and to fabricate convincingly.”); Martinez, supra note 119,
at 151 (“Courts have repeatedly acknowledged the witness’ strong motive to lie”
when cooperation agreement reduces jail time); C. Blaine Elliott, Life’s
Uncertainties: How To Deal With Cooperating Witnesses and Jailhouse Snitches,
16 CAP. DEF. J. 1, 7 (2003) (“The testimony of informants who have received deals
from prosecutorial agencies is suspicious from the outset.”); Emily Jane Dodds,
Note, I’ll Make You a Deal: How Repeat Informants are Corrupting the Criminal
Justice System and What to Do About It, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1063, 1075 (2008)
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mass atrocities are not uniquely plagued by that phenomenon.
Perjuring insiders are, however, likely to have a more pronounced
and distortive effect on fact-finding in mass atrocity prosecutions
because, as noted above, such prosecutions are far less likely to
receive other probative evidence that might reveal or cast doubt on
the perjured testimony. International criminal transcripts are
filled with the testimony of insider witnesses who fell out with
their former partners-in-crime and later detested them;131 insiders
who sought to shift blame to defendants in order to minimize their
own criminal responsibility;132 and insiders who sought to
exculpate defendants with whom they shared continuing bonds of
loyalty.133 Not surprisingly, the international tribunals have
(describing an Innocence Project report that found that an insider witness
testified against the defendant in more than 15% of wrongful convictions
subsequently overturned by DNA evidence).
131. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript,
at 30 (Mar. 11, 2005) (stating that insider witness had reason to dislike defendant
because defendant had fired the witness).
132. See, e.g., Kanyarukiga Judgment, supra note 123, ¶ 578 & n.1607
(“Given that Witness CDL is still serving time in Rwanda for crimes related to
the events of 1994, he could have personal motivations to implicate the Accused
while minimising his own role in the attacks.”); Prosecutor v. Ndahimana, Case
No. ICTR-01-68-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 244 (Dec. 30, 2011),
http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-01-68/trialjudgements/en/111230.pdf [hereinafter Ndahimana Judgment] (“As shown by the
evidence in this case, the witness may have tried to minimise his own role in
events.”); Prosecutor v. Setako, Case No. ICTR-04-81-T, Judgement and Sentence,
¶ 156 (Feb. 25, 2010), http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/ casedocuments/ictr-04-81/trial-judgements/en/100225.pdf
[hereinafter
Setako
Judgment] (“The potential, therefore, exists that the witness’s testimony may be
influenced by a desire to positively impact his circumstances in Rwanda or to shift
blame to Setako either to minimize his own involvement or based on the belief
that Setako was behind his increased sentence.”); Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case
No. ICTR-97-36A-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 119 (July 5, 2010),
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4c722d350.pdf [hereinafter Munyakazi Judgment]
(“[A]t earlier stages of the proceedings in Rwanda, the witness may have
attempted to minimise his involvement in the genocide.”); Prosecutor v. Muvunyi,
Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 156 (Sept. 12, 2006),
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/ICTR/MUVUNYI_ICTR-0055/MUVUNYI_ICTR-2000-55A-T.pdf (“[Witness] had reason to enhance
Muvunyi’s participation in the genocidal campaign and in that way attempt to
diminish his own role therein.”); see also id. ¶¶ 131, 309, 371, 420, 421 (describing
witness’s involvement with crimes).
133. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgement, ¶ 566
(Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/RUF/1234/ SCSL-0415-T-1234-searchable.pdf [hereinafter RUF Judgment] (rejecting one witness’s
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recognized the increased uncertainty inherent in insider witness
testimony and have typically treated it “with caution.”134
testimony because the “witness did not testify in order to assist the
Chamber . . . but to assist the Accused”).
134. Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14J, Separate Concurring
and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Hon. Justice Bankole Thompson Filed
Pursuant to Article 18 of the Statute, ¶ 47 (Aug. 2, 2007); see also Prosecutor v.
Renzaho, Case No. ICTR-97-31-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶¶ 166, 240, 312,
321,
410,
487,
557,
569,
594,
652,
734
(July
14,
2009),
http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-97-31/trialjudgements/en/090714.pdf
[hereinafter
Renzaho
Judgment]
(carefully
scrutinizing insider witnesses’ testimony); Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No.
ICTR-01-64-T, Judgement, ¶ 86 (June 17, 2004) (same); Prosecutor v. Gatete,
Case No. ICTR-2000-61-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 405 (Mar. 31, 2011),
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4d9c16642.pdf [hereinafter Gatete Judgment]
(assessing witness’s for bias because his testimony “may have been influenced by
a desire to positively impact his circumstances in Rwanda”); Prosecutor v.
Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶¶ 278, 449,
547, 552 (Dec. 6, 2010), http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/ unictr.org/files/casedocuments/ictr-00-55b/trial-judgements/en/101206.pdf
[hereinafter
Hategekimana Judgment] (considering credibility of the witnesses with caution);
Kanyarukiga Judgment, supra note 123, ¶¶ 181, 198, 306, 440–441, 452–453,
487, 576, 591 (treating insider witness testimony with caution); Karera
Judgment, supra note 65, ¶¶ 52, 165, 189, 215 (“[Witness] testimonies may have
been influenced by a wish to positively affect proceedings against them in
Rwanda.”); Munyakazi Judgement, supra note 132, ¶¶ 10, 119, 199, 206, 255, 366,
417; Ndahimana Judgement, supra note 132, ¶¶ 48–49, 248–249, 443, 454, 459–
461, 631, 687 (finding that “accomplice witness testimony” should be treated with
caution); Prosecutor v. Ngirabatware, Case No. ICTR-99-54-T, Judgement and
Sentence,
¶¶ 66,
193,
201,
283,
311,
479
(Dec.
20,
2012),
http://wwww.unictr.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-99-54/trialjudgements/en/121220.pdf [hereinafter Ngirabatware Judgment] (using caution
when evaluating accomplice testimony); Prosecution v. Nizeyimana, Case No.
ICTR-2000-55C-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶¶ 113, 504, 560, 608, 621, 811, 820,
836–838,
1107–1108
(June
19,
2012),
http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-00-55c/trialjudgements/en/120619.pdf [hereinafter Nizeyimana Judgment] (“Witness ZBH’s
incarceration at the time of his testimony necessitate[s] that his evidence be
viewed with the appropriate caution.”); Prosecutor v. Ntawukulilyayo, Case No.
ICTR-05-82-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶¶ 199, 219, 233, 266, 434 (Aug. 3,
2010),
http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-0582/trial-judgements/en/100803.pdf [hereinafter Ntawukulilyayo Judgment];
Prosecutor v. Nzabonimana, Case No. ICTR-98-44D-T, Judgement and Sentence,
¶¶ 226, 1064, 1142, 1210, 1276, 1348, 1447, 1480 (May 31, 2012),
http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-98-44d/trialjudgements/en/120531.pdf [hereinafter Nzabonimana Judgment] (“[T]he
Chamber does not doubt that detained accomplice witnesses may be motivated to
testify falsely for a number of reasons.”); Setako Judgment, supra note 132, ¶¶ 50,
72, 167, 200, 203, 250, 264, 339, 348, 367, 424 (“The Chamber has determined
elsewhere that there is a need to view his evidence with caution . . . .”). See
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Finally, because most defendants in mass atrocity trials are
not direct perpetrators, prosecutors frequently must employ
complex theories of liability to link the defendant to the crimes on
the ground. In some cases, prosecutors seek to hold high-ranking
defendants liable for the acts of their subordinates, but to do so,
they must establish a chain of command from the perpetrator to
the defendant along with the defendant’s authority over the direct
perpetrators.135 Although evidence of these elements might be
relatively easy to establish in cases where well-defined military
forces unquestionably carried out the crimes, armed conflicts in
many states feature combatants who hail both from regular
military forces and irregular paramilitary groups, so it is often
unclear which set of combatants is responsible for a given
massacre136 and, correspondingly, which commander bears
responsibility for the acts. Even when it is easy to identify the
group that perpetrated the atrocities, it may be difficult to know
whether the defendant exercised authority over that group. In
such cases, de jure authority may not reflect actual authority,137
and de facto authority may be the subject of unclear, conflicting
evidence.138
generally RICHARD MAY & MARIEKE WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
§ 6.23 (2002).
135. It is well-established in the case law that, to convict a defendant on a
theory of command responsibility, the prosecution must prove that the defendant
and the direct perpetrators stood in a superior-subordinate relationship. See
Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 346, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Nov.
16,
1998),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/981116_judg_en.pdf (providing the
essential elements of command responsibility); Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No.
SCSL-04-16-T, Judgement, ¶ 781 (June 20, 2007) [hereinafter AFRC Judgment].
136. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 150–
54 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf (finding that an
array of different violent groups could be performing killings).
137. See Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgement, ¶ 193 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Feb.
20,
2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf (“The power or
authority to prevent or punish does not solely arise from de jure authority
conferred through official appointment.”).
138. See Danner & Martinez, supra note 118, at 130 (“In many conflict
situations, there may be no clear evidence of a de jure hierarchy and it may be
difficult to prove the scope of a defendant’s effective de facto authority.”); see also
AFRC Judgment, supra note 1365, ¶¶ 539–544, 551, 564, 569, 581–584, 616, 626.
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3. The Coalescence of Location and Large-Scale Criminality
Sections 1 and 2 show that large-scale criminality creates its
own unique fact-finding challenges that are independent of the
challenges that stem from the location of the crime. In other words,
large-scale crimes give rise to certain fact-finding challenges
regardless of whether the crimes are perpetrated in developed or
developing nations. That said, this section will show that many of
the fact-finding challenges that arise during the prosecution of
large-scale crimes are exacerbated when those crimes take place
in developing nations. Similarly, this section will show that many
of the fact-finding challenges that arise when a crime occurs in a
developing nation are exacerbated when the crime is part of a mass
atrocity. A few examples will show how the size of the crime
interacts with the location of the crime to produce additional
fact-finding obstacles.
First, consider the command responsibility doctrine just
discussed in section 2. To hold a defendant liable on a command
responsibility theory, prosecutors must prove that the defendant
was in a superior/subordinate relationship with the direct
perpetrators of the crime.139 As section 2 indicated, that element
can be difficult to prove no matter where the crime is located.
Indeed, the ICTY acquitted a number of Yugoslav defendants of
command responsibility charges because prosecutors could not
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants had
authority over the direct perpetrators.140 However, as difficult as
it is to obtain convincing evidence of command responsibility in
139. Infra note 135 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Judgement,
¶¶ 605, 612, 1101 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 2006),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/hadzihasanovic_kubura/tjug/en/had-judg060315e.pdf
(rejecting prosecution’s allegations because defendants did not have “effective
control” of the brigade); Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgement,
¶ 841 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kordic_cerkez/tjug/en/kor-tj010226e.pdf (acquitting
defendant because “he possessed neither the authority to prevent the crimes that
were committed, nor to punish the perpetrators”); Prosecutor v. Halilović, Case
No. IT-01-48-T, Judgement, ¶ 752 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Nov. 16, 2005), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/halilovic/tjug/en/ tcj051116e.pdf
(“[Defendant’s] influence falls short of the standard required to establish effective
control.”).
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developed nations, it is usually harder in developing nations. For
instance, after civilians were attacked in South Sudan, the
spokesman for the South Sudanese Army highlighted the difficulty
of knowing which group was responsible. As he observed:
“Everyone is armed, and everyone has access to uniforms and we
have people from other organized forces.”141 In addition, chains of
authority are often more fluid and transitory during conflicts in
developing nations. Shifting, temporary allegiances were notorious
features of the conflict in the DRC,142 for example, and in various
SCSL trials, judges heard wildly conflicting testimony regarding
the structure, hierarchy, and leadership of the various fighting
forces in Sierra Leone.143 Indeed, in the RUF case, the SCSL
struggled to make sense of complexly organized rebel groups that
displayed multiple functional layers that were not strictly
hierarchically structured.144 The SCSL faced similar challenges in
the AFRC case, where the Trial Chamber candidly acknowledged
“that the AFRC was not a traditional military organization”145 and
that the defendant “had less control over his troops than a
commander would have over highly disciplined troops in a regular
141. Jason Patinkin, Rampaging South Sudan Troops Raped Foreigners,
Killed Local, AP (Aug. 16, 2016), https://apnews.com/237fa4c447d74698804
be210512c3ed1 (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
142. See COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE EASTERN CONGO: A CFR
INFOGUIDE PRESENTATION, https://www.cfr.org/interactives/eastern-congo#!/ (“[A]
multitude of ethnically based local militias have added to the chaos with their
opaque networks of shifting alliances.”); S. AFR. INST. OF INT’L AFFAIRS,
INTELLIGENCE UPDATE, GUERRILLAS IN THEIR MIDST: SHIFTING ALLIANCES IN THE
DRC 1 (July 13, 1999) (discussing alliance shifts in the Democratic Republic of
Congo); see also Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-tENG, Judgment
pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 601 (Mar. 7, 2014), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_04025.PDF (explaining that Ngiti combatants were
part of different alliances).
143. See AFRC Judgment, supra note 1365, ¶¶ 539–544, 551, 564, 569, 581–
584, 616, 626 (describing hierarchy of the organization); RUF Judgment, supra
note 133, at nn.1205, 1213–19, 1222–24 (citing testimony in closed session).
144. See Harmen van der Wilt, Command Responsibility in the Jungle: Some
Reflections on the Elements of Effective Command and Control, in THE SIERRA
LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY: THE IMPACT FOR AFRICA AND
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 144, 151 (Charles Chernor Jalloh ed., 2014) (“[T]he
SCSL had to grapple with a complex organization, displaying several functional
layers that were not strictly hierarchically structured.”).
145. AFRC Judgment, supra note 1365, ¶ 1738.
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army.”146 Finally, the chains of authority that do exist in
developing nations are less likely to be committed to writing. As
noted, SCSL trials featured considerable, if conflicting, testimony
about chains of authority,147 but little documentary evidence
corroborating that testimony.
Second, the problematic features of the evidence available in
developing nations are apt to be magnified when the crime under
prosecution is a mass atrocity. For instance, Part I noted that
eyewitness testimony is frequently unreliable, so the
predominance of eyewitness testimony in trials in developing
nations renders their judgments less certain than judgments that
are based on both testimonial and non-testimonial evidence. But
the quality of the eyewitness testimony—or stated differently, the
likelihood that it is inaccurate—varies with the trial, and I
maintain that trials of mass atrocity are more likely to feature
unreliable or inaccurate witness testimony than trials of isolated
crimes. For one thing, whereas isolated crimes are prosecuted soon
after they occur, mass atrocities frequently are not prosecuted for
years and sometimes decades after their occurrence.148 Because
memories of events fade over time, for that reason alone we can
expect a greater proportion of witnesses in mass atrocity
146. Id. ¶ 1740.
147. See id. ¶¶ 553, 561, 564, 576 (finding discrepancy between testimonies
about who was in command). See generally Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL04-15-T, Transcript, at 5 (Jan. 21, 2005) (same); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No.
SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 77 (Jan. 27, 2005) (same); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case
No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 112 (May 4, 2007) (same); Prosecutor v. Sesay,
Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 29 (May 22, 2007) (same); Prosecutor v.
Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 20 (May 23, 2007) (same);
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 71–72, 101–102 (Oct.
22, 2007) (same); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 44
(Nov. 23, 2007) (same); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript,
at 3–6; 30–33 (June 9, 2008) (same).
148. Witnesses testifying in the most recent ICTY and ICTR cases described
events that had occurred nearly twenty years before their testimony. See
Prosecutor v. Stanišić, Case No. IT-08-91-T, Judgement, ¶ 145 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Mar.
27,
2013),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/zupljanin_stanisicm/tjug/en/130327-1.pdf
(noting
that witnesses testified about events in 1992 and acknowledging the risks of time
passing). And ECCC witnesses described events that took place in the 1970s; that
is, approximately 40 years before their testimony. See Duch Judgment, supra note
49, ¶ 11 (noting, in 2009, that the charges against the defendant stemmed from
actions taken between 1975 and 1979).
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prosecutions to testify inaccurately than witnesses in prosecutions
of isolated crimes. We also might expect a greater proportion of
witnesses in mass atrocity prosecutions to testify inaccurately
because the events they witnessed were so devastating. Research
shows that those who witness violent events are more likely to
misperceive than those who witness nonviolent events149 because
an individual’s ability to perceive declines when he or she is
experiencing stress.150 Similarly, studies indicate that traumatic
memories are stored differently than non-traumatic memories and
are usually recalled in a more fragmented, non-chronological
way.151 Although all crime victims are apt to be traumatized by
their criminal experience, on average victims of mass atrocity may
well suffer greater trauma as a result of the arguably greater
suffering they endured. Many Tutsi victims of the Rwandan
genocide spent days and weeks literally hiding for their lives, while
all of their Tutsi family, friends, and neighbors were massacred
around them.152 Similarly, many Muslim women from Srebrenica
149. See ELIZABETH LOFTUS ET AL., EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL 25 (2007) (finding that the “accuracy of person descriptions was poorer
in the violent condition” compared with nonviolent conditions in the experience).
150. See, e.g., John C. Brigham et al., The Effect of Arousal on Facial
Recognition, 4 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 279, 291 (1983) (“Considering the
generally stressful experience of crimes, eyewitnesses can be expected to provide
relatively unreliable evidence.”); Sven-Ake Christianson & Elizabeth F. Loftus,
Memory for Traumatic Events, 1 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 225, 227 (1987)
(“[T]he more peripheral details of an emotional event are remembered less well
than the peripheral details of a non-emotional event.”); Brian R. Clifford & Clive
R. Hollin, Effects of the Type of Incident and the Number of Perpetrators on
Eyewitness Memory, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 364, 369 (1981) (“[T]he direct effect
of witnessed violence was the impairment of eyewitness memory . . . .”); Saul M.
Kassin, Eyewitness Identification: Victims Versus Bystanders, 14 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 519, 520 (1984) (finding that bystanders provide more accurate
testimony of a crime than victims); Douglas P. Peters, Eyewitness Memory and
Arousal in a Natural Setting, in 1 PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF MEMORY: CURRENT
RESEARCH AND ISSUES: MEMORY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 89, 94 (Michael M. Gruneberg
et al. eds., 1988) (finding that eyewitness testimony is less accurate when witness
is subjected to high stimulus environment).
151. See Ntaganda Transcript, Apr. 18, 2016, supra note 103, at 23 (testimony
of expert witness Dr. John Charles Yuille); Hugues F. Herve, Barry S. Cooper &
John C. Yuille, Biophysical Perspectives on Memory Variability in Eyewitnesses,
in APPLIED ISSUES IN INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING, EYEWITNESS MEMORY, AND
CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT 99, 104 (Barry S. Cooper et al. eds., 2013).
152. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, Judgement
and Sentence, ¶¶ 153–155 (Feb. 25, 2004); Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No.
ICTR-99-54A-T, Judgement, ¶ 350 (Jan. 22, 2004); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case
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lost all of their male relatives—their husbands, sons, brothers,
fathers and nephews—while some of the few men who survived did
so by lying amongst piles of corpses until they were able to
escape.153 Thus, as awful as it is to witness or be the victim of an
isolated violent crime, in terms of trauma, it likely pales in
comparison to being a witness or victim of a mass atrocity.154
The long duration of many mass atrocities also negatively
impacts victims’ ability to accurately recall their details. Many
witnesses in the ICC’s Lubanga case were girls who had been
abducted and had endured repeated rapes and other forms of
sexual assault over long periods of time.155 Similarly, the “bush
wives” in Sierra Leone, who testified before the SCSL, were
subjected to collective rape and various forms of sexual slavery for
months and years at a time.156 Research shows that individuals
such as these—who are victims of repeated, similar crimes—blend
their memories of the individual traumatic events that they
suffered into a generalized recollection called a “script memory.”157
No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgement and Sentence, ¶¶ 806–813 (Jan. 27, 2000)
[hereinafter Musema Judgment].
153. See Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, ¶ 5663
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2016) (“Some witnesses
described hiding underneath the bodies of their fellow detainees and escaping the
killing sites under perilous circumstances.”); Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT98-33-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 69, 207 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug.
2, 2001) (“At several of the sites, a few wounded people survived by pretending to
be dead and then crawled away.”).
154. See Witteveen, supra note 7, at 385 (describing the gruesome nature of
mass atrocities and the trauma experienced by witnesses).
155. See Lubanga Judgment, supra note 22, ¶¶ 890–895 (describing sexual
violence experienced by women at “demobilisation centres”); see also U.N. ORG.
STABILIZATION MISSION IN THE DEM. REP. CONGO (MONUSCO), INVISIBLE
SURVIVORS: GIRLS IN ARMED GROUPS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO FROM
2009
TO
2015
(2015),
https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/151123-Girls-in-Armed-Groups-2009-2015-Final.pdf
(stating abducted Congolese girls spent an average of six months with their
abductors and as long as four years).
156. AFRC Judgment, supra note 1365, ¶¶ 701, 709–713; see also U.N. SEC.
COUNCIL, SIXTH REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
OBSERVER
MISSION
IN
SIERRA
LEONE
6–9
(1999),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6af804.html. See generally CHRIS COULTER,
BUSH WIVES AND GIRL SOLDIERS: WOMEN’S LIVES THROUGH WAR AND PEACE IN
SIERRA LEONE 126–50 (2009) (discussing “[w]ar [r]apes and [g]endered [vi]olence”
experienced by women).
157. See Ntaganda Transcript, Apr. 18, 2016, supra note 103, at 35–36
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Such victims typically are able to recall the script with reasonable
accuracy, but are unable to recall the isolated events that gave rise
to the script.158 Accurately recalling the script may be sufficient for
some mass atrocity prosecutions, but not for those that require
witnesses to testify about specific events.
Finally, the characteristics of witnesses from developing
nations also combine with the characteristics of mass atrocities to
produce unique fact-finding challenges. Take, for example, the fact
that mass atrocity witnesses from developing nations often are
unable to date the events they witnessed. That inability—and the
resulting fact-finding uncertainty at trial—stems neither from the
location of the crimes alone nor the size and scope of the crimes
alone, but rather from a combination of the two. We know that it
is not the developing status of the location of the crime alone that
drives witnesses’ dating difficulties because witnesses from those
same locations regularly establish the dates of the isolated crimes
that they witness.159 Moreover, even if a given witness cannot
accurately date an isolated crime, his or her failure to do so usually
does not impair accurate fact-finding because the date will have
been recorded when the crime was initially reported.160 Because
most mass atrocities, by contrast, feature large numbers of similar
crimes that take place over the course of months or years, they
prove far more difficult to date. Indeed, most mass atrocities do not
(containing the testimony of expert witness Dr. John Charles Yuille); Herve et al.,
supra note 151, at 107.
158. See Ntaganda Transcript, Apr. 18, 2016, supra note 103, at 35–36; Herve
et al., supra note 151, at 107.
159. Isolated crimes are usually reported immediately after they occur, so a
witness who may have no clue as to the date of a mass atrocity will often be able
to date an isolated crime. See, e.g., Davis v. Republic, (127 of 2005) TZCA 2 (June
27, 2005) (Tanzania) (providing dates for isolated crime); Nyander v. RL, LRSC 9
(21 Jan. 2011) (Liberia) (same); Fallah v. RL, LRSC 16 (9 Aug. 2007) (Liberia)
(same); Nimungu v. Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 06 of 2012) UGCA 25 (6 June
2016) (Uganda) (same).
160. See, e.g., Uganda v. Ssemanda, (HCT-06-CR-SC-0059 of 2013)
UGHCCRD 44 (28 Apr. 2016) (Uganda) (stating the alleged rape occurred on
September 30, 2012 and was immediately reported to the police, and the date of
the offense was corroborated by the medical report admitted into evidence
documenting the victim’s medical exam that immediately followed the offense);
People v. Twambo, (2016) J1, J9 [HC] (Zam.) (stating the offense occurred on May
24, 2013, was reported to the police the following day, and the date of the offense
was corroborated by the medical report admitted into evidence documenting
medical attention provided immediately following the offense).
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even become the subject of an official investigation until years after
they occurred, so frequently, the only way to determine when they
did occur is to rely on the testimony of witnesses, witnesses whose
memories have faded by that time.161 At the same time, it is also
not the size of the crime alone that leads to dating difficulties, but
also its location. Although any witness is apt to have difficulty
recalling the precise date of a crime that occurred long ago and in
the context of numerous similar crimes that were perpetrated over
the course of months or years, witnesses from a developing nation,
who may not be able to read a calendar or who have little need for
Western-style precision regarding dates,162 will have considerably
more difficulty. As discussed below, many Sierra Leonean
witnesses could not even pinpoint the year or month of the crime
they were describing163 whereas that level of imprecision is rare
among Western witnesses.
Although the coalescence of the nature of the crime and the
location of the crime explains much of the fact-finding uncertainty
we have observed over the years, it does not reduce its impact. If a
Trial Chamber cannot ascertain when the relevant crimes took
place, then the defendant cannot prove that he was in another
location at the time of the crimes. More generally, Trial Chambers
that cannot determine simple facts surrounding the crimes find
themselves confronting many other uncertainties. In numerous
ICTR cases, for instance, witnesses who testified about meetings,
speeches, or other events were found not to corroborate one
another because their accounts were so undetailed that the Trial
Chambers could not determine whether the witnesses were even
describing the same event.164
161. Supra notes 127–128 and accompanying text.
162. See NYSTEDT ET AL., supra note 117, at 85 (advising those interviewing
witnesses that “[i]n some areas of the world people will not relate to the
international calendar [so interviewers should] try asking them to relate [the
event in question] to a particular season, holiday, or feast day or agricultural
event (e.g., a harvest)”); id. at 48 (stating that time markers such as important
holidays or agricultural events “are often used by local inhabitants when
explaining when significant events occurred”); see also FACT-FINDING WITHOUT
FACTS, supra note 7, at 82 (observing that witnesses may have different
understandings of distance and time).
163. Infra notes 179–183 and accompanying text.
164. See Ndahimana Judgment, supra note 132, ¶¶ 539–541 (finding
inconsistencies in the testimony of different witnesses); Gatete Judgment, supra
note 134, ¶¶ 199, 223 (same); Ntawukulilyayo Judgment, supra note 134, ¶¶ 231,
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4. Variations in Size, Scope, and Political Context
Thus far, this section has explored the fact-finding difficulties
that arise when large-scale criminality is prosecuted. Throughout
the section, I have compared prosecutions of mass atrocities with
prosecutions of isolated crimes in order to show the way in which
prosecutions that involve large-scale criminality give rise to
unique, often severe, fact-finding challenges. Up until now, and for
the sake of comparison, I have largely treated mass atrocities as a
uniform phenomenon and compared them to isolated domestic
crimes, which I have also treated somewhat monochromatically.
But, of course, much variation exists in both sets of crimes; mass
atrocities in particular come in a variety of shapes, sizes, and
political contexts. This subsection, then, explores some of those
variations and considers their evidentiary implications. In
particular, whereas this section as a whole has shown that mass
atrocity prosecutions are more likely to feature factual uncertainty
than isolated crime prosecutions, this subsection asks whether we
can draw distinctions among mass atrocities of different sizes and
scopes. Put another way, it asks whether there is reason to believe
that prosecutions of more-massive mass atrocities feature greater
fact-finding obstacles than prosecutions of less-massive mass
atrocities.
Before delving into this question, we must first recognize that
the size and scope of a given mass atrocity can differ dramatically
from the size and scope of the particular crimes that prosecutors
might choose to charge. We have already observed that prosecutors
of mass atrocities charge only a small subset of mass atrocity
offenders.165 In addition, prosecutors of mass atrocities—and
particularly prosecutors targeting high-level offenders—routinely
charge only a subset of the crimes they believe that a given
defendant committed because prosecuting the defendant for all of
his indictable offenses would cost too much and take too long.166
389 (same).
165. See NYSTEDT ET AL., supra note 117, at 43.
166. Indeed, commentators have criticized international prosecutors for
issuing broad indictments or seeking the joinder of indictments to create one
overly broad trial. See, e.g., Gideon Boas, Slow Poison: Joinder and the Death of
Milošević, in THE MILOŠEVIĆ TRIAL: AN AUTOPSY 106, 113–18 (Timothy William
Waters ed., 2013); Gwynn MacCarrick, Lessons from the Milosevic Trial, ON LINE
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This selective charging has obvious fact-finding implications: all
things being equal, the more events, crime sites, and charges that
prosecutors include in an indictment, the greater the likelihood
that the fact-finder will reach mistaken conclusions about some of
those events, crime sites, and charges. Stated differently, all things
being equal, narrowly-tailored indictments will give rise to less
fact-finding uncertainty than broader, more expansive
indictments.
Because that observation is somewhat self-evident, we can put
prosecutorial charging discretion to one side and consider the more
interesting question of the way in which the size and scope of the
atrocity itself might impact accurate fact-finding. However, even
this question requires some preliminary analysis because the size
and scope of an atrocity can be measured in a host of different
ways. We might measure the size and scope of an atrocity by its
number of victims, for instance, or by its duration, or its
OPINION (Apr. 26, 2006), http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp? article=4394
(last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Cf. Öberg, supra note 50, at 115 (observing that “[m]ost international
criminal indictments are very broad in their scope”). Partly in response, ICC
prosecutors brought a very narrow indictment against the Court’s first defendant,
Thomas Lubanga, and charged him only with the enlistment and conscription of
child soldiers, when he could have been charged with many other crimes. See
Roman Graf, The International Criminal Court and Child Soldiers, 10 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 945, 946 (2012). Similarly, Iraqi High Tribunal prosecutors initially
prosecuted Saddam Hussein only for the massacres in Dujail, when Hussein was
believed to have killed hundreds of thousands as part of other crimes. See Alleged
Crimes
of
Saddam
Hussein,
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
19,
2005),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/oct/19/iraq (last visited Jan. 22, 2018)
(listing alleged crimes of Saddam Hussein’s from 1970’s to 2003) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Indictments deemed too narrowly tailored are
also subject to criticism. See Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61-S,
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Wolfgang Schomburg, ¶¶ 4–12 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 30, 2004) (criticizing the prosecution for issuing
indictments that “arbitrarily present facts, selected from the context of a larger
criminal plan and, for unknown reasons, limited to one day and to the village of
Glogova only”); Mariana Goetz, Reparative Justice at the International Criminal
Court: Best Practice or Tokenism, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY: THE HEALING ROLE OF REPARATION 53, 59 (Jo-Anne M. Wemmers ed.,
2014) (reporting on victims’ shock and dismay upon learning that the ICC’s
charges against Lubanga would be limited to his involvement in the enlistment
and conscription of child soldiers); Paul Seils, The Selection and Prioritization of
Cases by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, in
CRITERIA FOR PRIORITIZING AND SELECTING CORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CASES
69, 74 (Morton Bergsmo ed., 2d ed. 2010) (same).
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geographical scope. Or we might assess the size and scope of an
atrocity by the level of harm inflicted; on that measure, we might
distinguish between an atrocity featuring mass killings and an
atrocity featuring mass detentions, and rank the former as more
massive by virtue of its enhanced gravity.
Differences in the measures just described will certainly have
some fact-finding impact, but not an impact that is easy to
ascertain or that systematically points to greater or lesser factual
uncertainty at trial. For instance, atrocities that feature more
victims will likely feature more individuals who can later testify
about the crimes (if the victims survive to tell the tale), or more
forensic evidence (if the victims do not). Differences in the severity
of the harms encompassed in an atrocity will likely have a similar
impact. Large-scale killings might give rise to fewer victim
witnesses and more forensic evidence, whereas large-scale
detentions might give rise to more victim witnesses and less
forensic evidence. These distinctions, however, are not likely to
have a dramatic impact on fact-finding accuracy. Victim witnesses
are not generally hard to come by,167 and, as mentioned above,
forensic evidence often has little relevance if the defendant is a
high-level offender who never set foot at the crime scene.168
Indeed, international criminal lawyers frequently distinguish
between crime-base evidence and linkage evidence.169 As those
names suggest, crime-base evidence informs fact-finders about the
actual crimes that took place; for example, the killings, rapes, or
property destruction that occurred during an attack.170 Linkage
167. Indeed, because testifying can endanger witnesses, some prosecutors
seek to use as few as possible. See MAHONY, supra note 79, at 31 (“The prosecution
hopes to require only a small number of witnesses, usually between 20 or 30, for
each case.”).
168. See supra notes 118–126 and accompanying text.
169. See Whiting, supra note 27, at 338 (stating that the prosecutor’s “focus
will generally be less on the crimes themselves than on the linkage between the
crimes and the Accused”); Bergsmo & Wiley, supra note 126, at 8–11 (describing
the two components of the initial phases of inquiries and investigations of an
international criminal investigation as the work to establish the crime in the case
and the process to develop the link between the suspect and the perpetrator of
the crime); Jackson, supra note 7, at 30–31 (detailing how in some tribunals,
different evidentiary rules govern the introduction of the two different kinds of
evidence).
170. See BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, supra note 49, at 7–8 (defining the
crime base as “the event and actors present at or near the scene of the crime”).
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evidence serves to link the defendant to those crimes.171 The
distinctions in size, scope, and severity just described are most
likely to influence the quantity and quality of crime-base evidence
available at a given trial, not the linkage evidence.172 Thus, a crime
that features more victims will provide prosecutors with more
potential crime-base witnesses to describe the atrocity, but unless
this is a rare instance in which the defendant is accused of
personally perpetrating the crime, the increased number of
crime-base witnesses will only make it easier to prove the (often
uncontested) fact that the crime took place; it will not enhance the
prosecutor’s ability to link (physically distant) defendants to the
crime. Moreover, because crime-base evidence tends to be far more
plentiful than linkage evidence, increases or decreases in the
former generally have little evidentiary impact.
The duration of the atrocities is also unlikely to have
considerable evidentiary impact, and their geographical scope may
have no evidentiary impact at all. For one thing, any difficulties
occasioned by an atrocity’s sprawling geographical or temporal
scope are apt to be ameliorated through the prosecution’s charging
decisions.173 That is, prosecutors frequently focus their indictments
on atrocities occurring during a particular time frame or in a
particular region in order to make their trials more manageable.
Even if they do not, however, little likely turns on it. To be sure, it
is more costly and time-consuming to investigate crimes that span
a broad geographical area than it is to investigate more
geographically circumscribed crimes.174 But there is little reason
to believe that investigations of geographically sprawling atrocities
give rise to less credible or less plentiful evidence than
investigations of less geographically sprawling crimes. By
171. See NYSTEDT ET AL., supra note 117, at 43 (explaining how “investigators
and analysts must . . . work together to uncover information which can be used
as evidence linking those allegedly most responsible for the commission of the
crimes to the crime scene”).
172. Id.
173. See Seils, supra note 166, at 71 (discussing the ICC’s case selection
criteria as including “the scale of the crime in question, including the number of
victims and possible considerations of temporal and geographic intensity”).
174. See U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for
Post-Conflict States: Prosecution Initiatives, at 8, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/06/4 (2006)
(“Trials for system crimes tend to be large and costly, as demonstrated by the ad
hoc International Criminal Tribunals.”).
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contrast, atrocities that occur over long periods of time may give
rise to less accurate testimony in part because it is harder to
accurately date a particular event when that event is one of a
series of similar events that occurred over a long period of time.175
My previous research bears out this common-sense conclusion.
Although many witnesses at all three of the tribunals that I
studied176 had difficulty providing exact dates for the events they
witnessed,177 SCSL witnesses—who were victims of a decade-long
war—frequently could not even get close.178 Indeed, SCSL
witnesses who could recall the month a crime occurred were
comparatively precise,179 given that many SCSL witnesses could
testify only that the crime occurred during the dry season or the

175. FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 24–25.
176. The tribunals under study were the ICTR, SCSL, and Special Panels. See
generally id.
177. Id. at 24–27.
178. Id. at 25.
179. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript,
at 61 (Apr. 6, 2005); Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T,
Transcript, at 86 (Apr. 11, 2005); Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-0416-T, Transcript, at 96 (June 27, 2005) [hereinafter Brima Transcript, June 27,
2005]; Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, at 100
(June, 20, 2005) (recalling that an event occurred in May 1997); Prosecutor v.
Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, at 8 (July, 1, 2005) (recollecting
that an event occurred in March of 1998); Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No.
SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, at 44 (July 7, 2005) [hereinafter Brima Transcript,
July 7, 2005] (demonstrating the witness’s inability to recall the date he was
captured); Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, at 56,
74–75 (July 11, 2005) (discussing the witness’s inability to recount dates attacks
occurred); Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, at 25
(July 12, 2005) (showing discrepancies in witness’s dating of events); Prosecutor
v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, at 26, 49 (July 13, 2005) (“I
could not remember day, but it was in August.”); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No.
SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 80–81 (Oct. 4, 2004) (demonstrating the witness’s
ability to the recount the month an event occurred); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No.
SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 182 (Oct. 8, 2004) (“It was June I said.”); Prosecutor
v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 50, 57, 78 (Oct. 14, 2004) (“I can
recollect the month, but not the date.”); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-0415-T, Transcript, at 31, 92 (Oct. 18, 2004); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL04-15-T, Transcript, at 96 (Oct. 25, 2004) (“I can’t remember the date now, but it
did happen.”); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 13–14
(Oct. 27, 2004) (showing that a witness could date an event as within a couple of
months).
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rainy season180 or during a particular year.181 Some witnesses,
indeed, could not even identify the year in which the crime
occurred.182 Indeed, in the SCSL’s CDF case, date questions proved
so difficult for witnesses that when one defense counsel, Dr. Jabbi,
asked a witness, “on what day did the Kamajors enter Kenema?”
the presiding judge remarked sarcastically, “Dr. Jabbi, I wish you
luck.”183
For this reason, atrocities of longer duration are probably
subject to more fact-finding uncertainty than atrocities of a shorter
duration, but the differences may not have significant practical
import because many international criminal witnesses have
difficulty accurately dating events regardless of the atrocity’s
duration. To be sure, witnesses are more likely to dramatically
misdate events when they occur in the context of longer-running
180. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 2–
3, 11 (July 21, 2004); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at
8, 21–22 (Oct. 21, 2004); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript,
at 94–97 (Jan. 13, 2005); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript,
at 79 (Mar. 17, 2006); Fofana Transcript, June 21, 2004, supra note 64, at 54–55;
Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript, at 6966 (Apr. 8, 2008);
Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript, at 7017, 7052 (Apr. 9,
2008); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript, at 7388 (Apr. 14,
2008); Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript, at 160
(Sept. 14, 2004); Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript,
at 17, 24–25, 53 (Nov. 8, 2004) [hereinafter Fofana Transcript, Nov. 8, 2004];
Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript, at 4 (Nov. 12,
2004); Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript, at 45 (Nov.
16, 2004); Brima Transcript, Apr. 8, 2005, supra note 64, at 47; Prosecutor v.
Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, at 82–83, 97–99 (June 30, 2005);
Brima Transcript, July 7, 2005, supra note 179, at 102, 112–13 (July 7, 2005);
Brima Transcript, July 14, 2005], supra note 64, at 41–42, 49; Prosecutor v. Brima
et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, at 68 (Sept. 15, 2005); Prosecutor v.
Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, at 62 (Sept. 19, 2005).
181. See Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript, at
20 (Nov. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Fofana Transcript, Nov. 11, 2004] (questioning a
witness who could not recall the precise date or month an event occurred); see also
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 3–4 (Oct. 11, 2004)
(“I can’t be too exact on the time frame.”).
182. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript,
at 30 (July 25, 2005) (conveying Witness TF1-157’s inability to recall even the
year in which rebels attacked Bonoya); Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL04-16-T, Transcript, at 73–74 (Apr. 7, 2005) (demonstrating Witness TF1-085’s
inability to state what year she was captured); Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case
No. SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript, at 37 (Sept. 21, 2004) [hereinafter Fofana
Transcript, Sept. 21, 2004].
183. Fofana Transcript, Sept. 21, 2004, supra note 182, at 37.
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atrocities than shorter-running atrocities,184 but the misdating
need not be dramatic to cause problematic uncertainty during
trial. For instance, the crimes comprising the Rwandan genocide
occurred, in most regions, over a few short weeks, yet dating
disparities and confusions were rife among ICTR witnesses.185
These dating disparities spanned only days or weeks and not
months or years, yet their impact on fact-finding was nonetheless
significant. As noted above, Trial Chambers often refused to find
one witness’s account of an event corroborative of another’s when
the witnesses dated the event differently.186 Likewise, Trial
Chambers often considered testimony that featured date
inconsistencies to be unreliable.187
The foregoing analysis suggests that the size and scope of a
mass atrocity is not likely to predict the level of evidentiary
184. See supra notes 174–183 and accompanying text (detailing witness’s
misdating of events that occurred during an atrocity that spanned ten years).
185. See, e.g., Nzabonimana Judgment, supra note 134, ¶ 419 (observing that
Witness CNR1’s dating of events was not consistent with Embassy telegrams);
Hategekimana Judgment, supra note 134, ¶ 175 (noting the Trial Chamber’s
concern about “the inconsistency in the Prosecution and Defence evidence about
the date on which Witness BUQ’s employers left their home in the Taba
neighbourhood”); Setako Judgment, supra note 132, ¶ 438 (explaining that “the
chronology provided by the witness for the events is not clear”); Ngirabatware
Judgment, supra note 134, ¶ 787 (describing discrepancies in the witness’s
estimates of time). Frequently, witnesses dated events differently in their pretrial
statements than they did in their testimony. See, e.g., Karera Judgment, supra
note 65, ¶¶ 135, 164, 226, 229; Kanyarukiga Judgment, supra note 123, ¶¶ 605–
606 (“Witnesses CBK and CDL gave testimony at trial that was inconsistent with
their prior statements.”); Prosecution v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A,
Judgment, ¶ 112 (May 23, 2005) (discussing “discrepancies between prior
statements and testimony”); Hategekimana Judgment, supra note 134, ¶¶ 131,
479 (describing two instances in which witnesses dated events differently during
pre-trial statements and trial testimony); Muhimana Judgment, supra note 104,
¶¶ 45–47, 65; Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgement and
Sentence, ¶¶ 55–60 (May 15, 2003); Nizeyimana Judgment, supra note 134, ¶ 41,
191; Prosecution v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 175–179,
194, 196, 204, 208–210, 218, 224, 318–327, 333–336, 342–343, 348, 366 (May 26,
2003); Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T, Judgement and
Sentence, ¶ 88 (May 16, 2003) (“The witness could not confirm the date on which
he fled and became a refugee, although he provided this date in his statement
dated 31 January 1996.”); Prosecution v. Renzaho, Case No. ICTR-97-31-A,
Judgement, ¶ 453 (Apr. 1, 2011).
186. Supra note 174 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71-I,
Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 239 (July 15, 2004).
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obstacles that trial participants will later experience. However, as
we saw earlier in this section, mass atrocities occur in certain
predictable contexts, and differences in these contextual features
can give rise to dramatically different levels of factual uncertainty
at trial.188 In this regard, two components appear particularly
influential: (1) the length of time that elapses between the crime
and the prosecution; and (2) the level of governmental interference
in the trial.
Turning first to the time lapse, subpart A showed that
prosecutions of atrocity crimes frequently must be delayed to allow
on-going conflicts to conclude and regions to stabilize. Subpart A
likewise observed that, although delaying prosecutions may be a
practical necessity in some circumstances, such delays inevitably
give rise to certain evidentiary costs, such as evidence destruction
and degradation. Here, I make the (hopefully uncontroversial)
additional observation that the longer the delay, the greater the
evidentiary costs that are likely to be incurred. That is, those
prosecutions that are delayed for longer periods of time are likely
to feature more fact-finding impediments than those that are
delayed for shorter periods of time.189 Craig Etcheson, for instance,
has compellingly described the way in which the forty-year delay
in Khmer Rouge prosecutions negatively impacted evidence in
Cambodia:
Many a time we have observed cows and pigs consuming human
bones that have been placed in open, unsecured genocide
memorials. Even the earth itself passively consumes the
evidence of genocide. The soils in much of Cambodia are highly
acidic, and they rapidly dissolve the remains of victims in mass
graves, including the bones of those interred in the graves. The
simple environmental encroachment of rats, insects, mildew,
seedlings, rust and rot in the extremely humid tropical
environment takes a fearsome toll not only on paper records and
human skeletal remains but also on more durable artifacts such
as torture devices and shackles and even permanent structures
like thatch, wooden, and even concrete or brick buildings.
Finally, in Cambodia, there is annual flooding . . . and thus we
188. Supra Part III.A.4.
189. See ETCHESON, supra note 100, at 66 (“[I]t is essential to move early and
move fast to gather the evidence of genocide and other crimes against humanity
from the field. Humans, animals, and the environment itself, . . . inexorably
consume the evidence of violations of international humanitarian law.”).
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have seen numerous instances where mass graves have been
washed away by the erosion of wandering rivers as they eat into
riverbanks.190

Finally, governmental interference in the prosecutions can
have a profound impact on the quantity and quality of the evidence
presented at trial. In most cases, governmental interference serves
to obstruct prosecutions, as will be discussed again in Part IV. To
that end, governments have destroyed incriminating evidence,191
hidden incriminating evidence,192 and intimidated witnesses to
prevent them from testifying.193 Less frequently, governments will
190.
191.
192.

Id.
See, e.g., supra notes 99–100 and accompany text.
See VICTOR PESKIN, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN RWANDA AND THE BALKANS:
VIRTUAL TRIALS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR STATE COOPERATION 82, 95, 106 (2008)
(describing Croatia’s and Serbia’s withholding of evidence from prosecutors); ERIC
STOVER ET AL., HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE PURSUIT OF WAR CRIMINALS FROM
NUREMBERG TO THE WAR ON TERROR 57 (2015) (describing incidents in which
American officials withheld evidence for political or military reasons); see also
supra note 113 and accompanying text (describing Serbs’ attempts to conceal
evidence of Srebrenica massacres). Finally, some governments do not bother
hiding evidence; they simply refuse to provide it to when asked by the court. See,
e.g., LIONEL NICHOLS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE END OF
IMPUNITY IN KENYA 165–66 (2015) (discussing the way in which Kenyan
authorities withheld requested evidence); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-9514-A, Judgement, ¶ 4 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004)
(describing Croatia’s failure to open its archives during the trial stage).
193. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: CROATIA 1 (2006) (“[Croatia’s] intimidation
of some witnesses in domestic war crimes trials remained a problem . . . .”);
Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., ICC-01/09-01/11-1866-Red, Public Redacted Version of
“Prosecution’s request for the admission of prior recorded testimony of
[REDACTED] witnesses,” 29 April 2015, ICC-01/09-01/11-1866-Conf + Annexes,
¶ 51, (May 21, 2015) (discussing testimony that was subject to interference); Press
Release, Kenya Human Rights Comm’n, Termination of Ruto and Sang Case at
the ICC: Witness Tampering Means Impunity Prevails Over Justice Again (Apr.
7, 2016), http://www.khrc.or.ke/2015-03-04-10-37-01/press-releases/528-kenyatermination-of-ruto-and-sang-case-at-the-icc-witness-tampering-means-impunityprevkenya-termination-of-ruto-and-sang-case-at-the-icc-witness-tamperingmeans-impunity-prevails-over-justice-again.html (describing the systematic
witness tampering and intimidation in Kenya cases); Tom Maliti, Prosecutor
Withdraws Seven Witnesses in Kenyatta Case in Past Year, INT’L JUST. MONITOR
(Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.ijmonitor.org/2014/01/prosecutor-withdrawsseven-witnesses-in-kenyatta-case-in-past-year/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (“The
International Criminal Court’s (ICC’s) prosecutor has withdrawn at least seven
witnesses in the case against President Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta over the past
year because the witnesses fear testifying, they have recanted their earlier
statements to investigators, or for other unspecified reasons.”) (on file with the
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impede defense counsel in an effort to ensure convictions.194
Regardless of whether the governmental interference serves to
obstruct the prosecution or the defense, it unquestionably
introduces significant factual uncertainty into the trial. Indeed,
this section has concluded that a variety of factors that serve to
differentiate one mass atrocity from another—including the
number of victims of the atrocity, the kinds of crimes comprising
the atrocity, and the duration and geographical scope of the
atrocity—likely have either a limited or an uncertain impact on
fact-finding. By contrast, governmental interference, we can say
with confidence, undermines fact-finding certainty in almost every
case. When governments interfere in prosecutions—whether to
withhold evidence or intimidate witnesses—they necessarily
distort the factual picture presented to fact-finders. Not all such
distortions have a dispositive impact on the trials’ verdicts, but all
do reduce the certainty of the Trial Chamber’s factual findings and
the confidence we can place in the accuracy of those findings.
B. The Legal Characterization of the Crime
Subpart A of this Part has identified the large size and scope
of mass atrocity crimes as an important factor explaining the
fact-finding challenges that confront many mass atrocity
prosecutions. In this subpart, we turn our attention from the
factual contours of the crimes to consider their legal
characterization. In particular, mass atrocities can be
characterized as international crimes or domestic crimes. For
example, a mass killing can be charged as domestic murder, or it
can be charged as one of a number of international crimes:
genocide, murder as a crime against humanity, or the war crime of
willful killing.195 This subpart shows that that characterization
decision can have important evidentiary implications.
Washington and Lee Law Review); Jackson & Brunger, supra note 85, at 171
(observing that states that are unwilling to investigate crimes themselves “may
have an interest in causing harm to witnesses”).
194. See Buisman, Prosecutor’s Obligation, supra note 122, at 208 (describing
the Congolese government’s refusal to allow defense counsel access to witnesses);
see also supra note 110 and accompanying text (“The Government of Rwanda, for
instance, allegedly prevented ICTR defense counsel from entering Rwanda . . . .”).
195. See U.S. INST. FOR PEACE, MODEL CODES FOR POST CONFLICT CRIMINAL
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It is reasonable to assume that greater fact-finding
uncertainty attends the prosecutions of international crimes than
domestic crimes for the simple reason that international crimes
have more elements than domestic crimes. Indeed, international
crimes typically include the elements of domestic crimes but also
feature additional attendant circumstances or mens rea elements.
Consider, for instance, a mass killing. If that mass killing is
charged as the domestic crime of murder, then prosecutors will
likely need to prove only that the defendant intentionally killed the
victim.196 By contrast, if that same mass killing were charged as
the war crime of willful killing, then the prosecutor would not only
need to prove that the defendant intentionally killed the victim,
but that the victim was a “protected person” under the Geneva
Conventions, that the killing took place in connection with an
international armed conflict, and that the defendant was aware of
the circumstances establishing the protected status of the victim
and the existence of the armed conflict.197 Similarly, if the mass
killing was charged as murder as a crime against humanity, then
the prosecutor would have to show both that the defendant
intentionally killed the victim and also that he did so in the context
of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population
of which he was aware.198 At a very minimum, then, proving
international crimes requires prosecutors to prove more elements
and thereby requires them to obtain and present more evidence.
JUSTICE
195
(2007),
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/MC1/MC1Part2Section1.pdf (“Intentional killing can be prosecuted under the MCC as a war
crime (willful killing), a crime against humanity (murder), and genocide
(killing).”).
196. See 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2012) (defining the elements of murder in the first
and second degree).
197. See, e.g., U.N. Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal
Court, Elements of Crimes, art. 8(2)(a)(i), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (June
30,
2000),
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/724/
27/PDF/N0072427.pdf?OpenElement [hereinafter ICC Elements of Crimes]
(listing the elements of the war crime of willful killing).
198. See ICTR Statute, supra note 44, art. 3 (listing elements of the crime
against
humanity);
S.C.
Res.
827,
art.
5
(May
25,
1993),
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf
[hereinafter ICTY Statute] (same). At the ICC, prosecutors additionally must
prove that the widespread or systematic attack occurred “pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.” ICC
Elements of Crimes, supra note 197, art. 7.
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These additional evidentiary burdens necessarily translate
into some additional fact-finding uncertainty, but how much
depends to some degree on which international crime is under
prosecution. In particular, the additional fact-finding uncertainty
is apt to be modest when the international crime in question is a
war crime or crime against humanity, but much more substantial
when the international crime is genocide. The reason is this: the
additional elements needed to prove crimes against humanity or
war crimes generally pertain to the violent context in which the
subject crimes were perpetrated, and rarely is there considerable
factual uncertainty about the existence of that violent context. In
war crimes prosecutions, for instance, there is seldom any serious
question that an armed conflict took place.199 It can be harder to
gather evidence of an attack on a civilian population, in order to
prove crimes against humanity, but the difficulties usually stem
primarily from time and resource constraints,200 rather than a lack
of evidence.201 Prosecutors at the Special Panels in East Timor, for
example, were forced to charge most of their early defendants with
domestic crimes, because they did not have the money or time to
gather the additional evidence needed to prove crimes against
humanity.202 But the evidence of the contextual elements for
crimes against humanity was available,203 and Special Panels’
199. To be sure, determining whether the armed conflict should be
categorized as international or non-international can be challenging, see, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 76–123 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000), but the existence of some kind of
armed conflict—which is the primary distinction between a domestic crime and a
war crime—is typically supported by ample evidence, see DAVID CHUTER, WAR
CRIMES: CONFRONTING ATROCITY IN THE MODERN WORLD 78 (2003).
200. See Bergsmo & Wiley, supra note 126, at 6 (“The search for evidence
[necessary to prove the widespread or systematic requirement of crimes against
humanity] requires investigative resources that are very often unavailable.”).
201. See Öberg, supra note 50, at 115 (“International criminal trials are
usually very complex and heavy on evidence.”).
202. See Suzannah Linton, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone:
Experiments in International Justice, 12 CRIM. L.F. 185, 215 (2001) [hereinafter
Linton, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone]; Suzannah Linton,
Correspondents’ Reports, 2 Y.B. INT’L HUM. L. 471, 481 (2000) (charging domestic
crimes as a “pragmatic” decision caused by the “inadequate resources and the
immensity of the task of proving international crimes” and that because suspects
could not be detained indefinitely pending investigation of international crimes,
“[t]he only other acceptable option would have been to release the suspects”).
203. See Linton, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone, supra note 202, at
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prosecutors soon began charging defendants with international
crimes.204
The additional elements needed to prove a genocide, by
contrast, relate not to the contextual violence that surrounds the
subject crimes but rather to the offender’s specific intent and the
victims’ membership in a protected group.205 In particular,
genocide is defined as the commission of an enumerated crime
against a racial, ethnic, religious, or national group, with the
specific intent to destroy the group in whole or in part.206 Finding
evidence of that specific intent can be extraordinarily
challenging:207 ICTY prosecutors repeatedly failed to prove
genocidal intent,208 and the ICC’s judiciary has also been sharply
207–08 (describing evidence of “clear patterns of a widespread, systematic attack
on the civilian population of East Timor coupled with official Indonesian
government involvement, the key elements of crimes against humanity”).
204. See David Cohen, Seeking Justice on the Cheap: Is the East Timor
Tribunal Really a Model for the Future?, in ASIAPACIFIC ISSUES, NO. 61, at 3
(2002).
205. Cf. AM. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGS. COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIMINAL COURT,
INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL
COURT
AND
GENOCIDE
7
(2007),
THE
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/e13974_1c0840ebd4fd4a0bae137d8c15580a60.pdf
(“Neither war crimes nor crimes against humanity require the special intent that
is necessary to prove the crime of genocide, thus these crimes are often easier
than genocide to prove in court even though they may be just as grave as
genocide.”).
206. See ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 197, art. 6 (defining the
elements of genocide at the ICC); see also ICTR Statute, supra note 44, art. 2
(defining the elements of genocide at the ICTR); ICTY Statute, supra note 198,
art. 4 (defining the elements of genocide at the ICTY).
207. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Observations Concerning the 1997–98
Preparatory Committee’s Work, 25 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 397, 413 (1997)
(stating that genocide’s “specific intent requirement makes its proof very
difficult”); L. Tabassi & E. van der Borght, Chemical Warfare as Genocide and
Crimes Against Humanity, 2 HAGUE JUST. J. 5, 7 (2007) (“Genocide has been
described as ‘the crime of crimes’ and is considered to be the most difficult crime
to prove due to the special intent that must be established in order to convict a
perpetrator.”); Michael J. Kelly, The Tricky Nature of Proving Genocide Against
Saddam Hussein Before the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 983,
984 (2005) (“[G]enocide has traditionally been the most difficult crime for
prosecutors to prove.”).
208. See Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgement, ¶ 108 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 1999) (“All things considered, the
Prosecutor has not established beyond all reasonable doubt that genocide was
committed . . . .”); Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement, ¶ 989
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 1, 2004) (finding there was
insufficient evidence to find the specific intent required for genocide); Prosecutor
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divided on the issue.209 Although it might be obvious that a
defendant intended to kill large numbers of individuals, it is often
much less obvious whom exactly he was targeting and, most
importantly, why.
In sum, characterizing a mass atrocity as an international
crime unquestionably increases the amount of evidence submitted
in a case210 and thereby increases—sometimes dramatically—the
cost and length of a trial.211 Somewhat less dramatic is its effect on
fact-finding. It is reasonable to assume that characterizing the
offense as an international crime rather than a domestic crime
introduces some additional uncertainty because the more elements
that fact-finders must decide, the more likely that they will decide
one of those elements erroneously. However, only when the crime
in question can be charged as a genocide might we reasonably
assume that the decision to characterize the crime as international
v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgement, ¶ 869 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2006) (“Considering the evidence as a whole, the
Chamber can make no conclusive finding that any acts were committed with the
intent [to commit genocide].”); Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T,
Judgement, ¶ 560 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003)
(acquitting the defendant of genocide); Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A,
Judgement, ¶ 134 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004)
(finding that the defendant’s genocidal intent had not been proven).
209. For instance, in the Al Bashir case, the Pre-Trial Chamber initially
refused to issue a warrant of arrest against Al Bashir for genocide, determining
that specific genocidal intent was not the only reasonable conclusion that could
be drawn from the evidence the Prosecution submitted. See Prosecutor v. Al
Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a
Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶¶ 205–206 (Mar. 4,
2009). Subsequently, the Appeals Chamber determined that the Pre-Trial
Chamber misapplied the relevant standard of proof. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir,
ICC-02/05-01/09-73, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor against the
“Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir,” ¶ 33 (Feb. 3, 2010). On remand, the Pre-Trial
Chamber found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Al Bashir had
acted with specific genocidal intent, so it added three charges of genocide to the
initial arrest warrant. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-94, Second
Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 5 (July 12,
2010).
210. See Öberg, supra note 50, at 116 (describing international criminal
indictments as holding “the potential for a flood of evidence”).
211. See Stuart Ford, Complexity and Efficiency at International Criminal
Courts, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 1 (2014) (“One of the most persistent criticisms
of international criminal tribunals has been that they cost too much and take too
long.”).
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rather than domestic will introduce considerable additional
fact-finding uncertainty.
IV. At Home or Abroad? The Fact-Finding Impact of the
Prosecuting Body
The two preceding Parts have established, respectively, that
the location of the mass atrocities and their size, scope, and legal
characterization are significant factors impacting the level of
factual uncertainty present in a mass atrocity trial. This Part
examines the evidentiary and fact-finding implications of the body
prosecuting the mass atrocities. In general, mass atrocities are
prosecuted in one of four different kinds of fora: a domestic court
in the state where the crimes took place (territorial court);212 a
domestic court in a non-territorial state, usually pursuant to
universal jurisdiction (foreign court);213 a court that has both
domestic and international components (hybrid court);214 and a
fully international court.215 As scholars have noted, different court
systems present different sets of advantages and disadvantages for
the prosecution of international crimes. For the purposes of this
paper, I focus solely on the differential fact-finding challenges that
typically attend the prosecutions of mass atrocities in the different
court systems. As the following discussion reveals, I conclude that
domestic courts exercising territorial jurisdiction confront the
fewest impediments to accurate fact-finding whereas wholly
international courts confront the most.

212. A few examples of states that prosecuted their own international crimes
include Argentina, Rwanda, and Ethiopia. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 9, at
169–71, 173–78.
213. See Máximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: The
Political Branches and the Transnational Prosecution of International Crimes,
105 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2011) (seeking to identify every universal jurisdiction
complaint from 1961 to 2011).
214. Some examples of courts featuring both domestic and international
components include the SCSL, the ECCC, and the Special Panels. For a
book-length description of these tribunals, see generally INTERNATIONALIZED
CRIMINAL COURTS: SIERRA LEONE, EAST TIMOR, KOSOVO, AND CAMBODIA (Cesare
P.R. Romano et al. eds., 2004).
215. Examples of fully international courts include the ICTY, the ICTR, and
the ICC.
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Before comparing the various bodies’ fact-finding capabilities,
we must first put to one side one factor that creates considerable
fact-finding uncertainty regardless of the body that is prosecuting
the offenses. That factor is governmental opposition to the
prosecutions. Part III already identified governmental opposition
to the prosecutions as a factor that is uniquely likely to create
fact-finding uncertainty at trial because governments that oppose
prosecutions typically obstruct investigations and/or prevent
access to relevant evidence and witnesses.216 We need to put such
opposition to one side, however, because its potential to impair
fact-finding inaccuracy—while substantial—transcends the
criminal justice system in which the crimes are prosecuted. That
is, governmental opposition to prosecutions has impaired
fact-finding accuracy in every possible court system.
Governmental opposition distorted fact-finding in fully
international courts, such as the ICTY217 and ICC,218 in hybrid
courts, such as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (ECCC)219 and the Special Panels,220 and even in foreign
courts prosecuting international crimes pursuant to universal
jurisdiction.221 Governmental opposition to prosecutions rarely
216. Supra Part III.A.1.b.
217. See, e.g., PESKIN, supra note 192, at 46–53.
218. Kenya’s opposition to prosecutions substantially impeded the ICC’s
ability to find accurate facts in the Kenyatta and Ruto cases. See, e.g., supra note
126 and accompanying text (discussing intimidation of witnesses by the Kenyan
government). Some reports indicate that Russia will seek to obstruct the ICC’s
investigations into international crimes in Georgia. See Russia refuses to
Cooperate with ICC Investigation into 2008 War Crimes, AGENDA.GE (Feb. 2,
2016), http://agenda.ge/news/51706/eng (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (describing
Russia’s failure to cooperate in ICC investigations) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Moscow Hints that it will not Cooperate with ICC’s
Investigation into 2008 Russo-Georgian War, UAWIRE (Feb. 19, 2016),
http://uawire.org/news/icc-will-not-yet-release-names-of-suspected-warcriminals-in-2008-russo-georgian-war (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (discussing
Russia’s intent to not further cooperate in ICC investigations) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
219. See Cambodia: Stop Blocking Justice for Khmer Rouge Crimes, HUM.
RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 22, 2015, 11:07 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/
2015/03/22/cambodia-stop-blocking-justice-khmer-rouge-crimes (last visited Jan.
22, 2018) (describing Cambodian resistance to ECCC investigations) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
220. Cohen, supra note 204, at 10.
221. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 291 (2003)
(discussing some of the pitfalls of universal jurisdiction as including States’
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arises in domestic courts that would prosecute atrocities occurring
on their own territory for the simple reason that courts in states
that oppose prosecutions are not able even to initiate
prosecutions.222 But for our purposes, the relevant point is that
when the government of the state where the crime took place
opposes prosecutions, then probative evidence located in that state
will be difficult to obtain no matter where those prosecutions are
being held.
When we put governmental opposition to prosecutions to one
side, we find a number of factors that suggest that fully
international courts, hybrid courts, and foreign courts all face
graver impediments to accurate fact-finding than territorial
domestic courts. First, whereas territorial court personnel usually
can communicate directly with defendants and witnesses,
international, hybrid, and foreign courts must employ language
interpretation to do so.223 The need for language interpretation in
court proceedings is well-established to cause considerable factual
uncertainty in those proceedings,224 so I will not rehearse the
reluctance to hand over evidence); Wolfgang Kaleck, From Pinochet to Rumsfeld:
Universal Jurisdiction in Europe 1998–2008, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 927, 962 (2009);
Menno T. Kamminga, Lessons Learned from the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction
in Respect of Gross Human Rights Offenses, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 940, 959–60 (2001).
Sometimes governmental opposition to universal jurisdiction prosecutions is so
robust that it leads not only to the dismissal of a particular case but also to
revisions in the law authorizing the exercise of universal jurisdiction. See Steven
R. Ratner, Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 888,
889 (2003) (describing Belgium’s willingness to gut its universal jurisdiction
statute following United States’ opposition).
222. It is common for international judges to observe that international courts
have more difficulty carrying out their prosecutions than domestic courts because
international courts do not have police or other law enforcement mechanisms at
their disposal in the way that domestic courts do. See SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEB.,
ANNUAL REPORT ¶ 61 (2009–2010), https://www.stl-ts l.org/en/documents/presidents-reports-and-memoranda/226-Annual-Report-2009-2010; Antonio Cassese, On the
Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of
International Humanitarian Law, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 2, 13 (1998) (describing how
the ICTY cannot fulfill its function without state cooperation). However, that
claim is slightly misleading. Domestic courts that are better able to conduct mass
atrocity prosecutions are domestic courts that are located in states that do not
oppose such prosecutions. When governmental opposition does exist, it impairs
fact-finding accuracy no matter which criminal justice system is conducting
prosecutions.
223. See FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 66 (discussing the
need for language translation in international tribunals).
224. See Joshua Karton, Lost in Translation: International Criminal
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problems at length here. Suffice it to say that international court
transcripts are replete with interpretation and translation
mistakes that eventually came to light,225 so we can presume that
many other, similar mistakes were made but never identified.
Consequently, all things being equal, the factual findings
generated by a trial featuring language interpretation are apt to
be less accurate than the factual findings generated by a trial
where no interpretation is needed.
Familiarity and knowledge about the atrocities and their
participants is another factor relevant to fact-finding accuracy at
trial, and one that also suggests an advantage for territorial courts.
It is safe to assume that the personnel of international, hybrid, and
foreign courts are, in general, less familiar with the cultural
practices of the defendants, witnesses, and victims of the mass
atrocities they prosecute and also less knowledgeable about
relevant political, social, and historical features of the atrocities.226
Tribunals and the Legal Implications of Interpreted Testimony, 41 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 1 (2008) (“When courtroom interpreters translate a witness’s
testimony, errors are not just possible, they are inherent to the process.”); Robert
Cryer, Witness Evidence Before International Criminal Tribunals, 3 L. & PRAC.
INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 411, 420–28 (2003) (articulating the problems associated
with translating witnesses’ testimony); FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note
7, at 66–79 (describing errors in language translation). For a discussion of
uncertainties caused by language interpretation at the Nuremberg and Tokyo
Tribunals, see JOSEPH E. PERSICO, NUREMBERG: INFAMY ON TRIAL 263 (1994);
HILARY GASKIN, EYEWITNESSES AT NUREMBERG 47 (1990); BRACKMAN, supra note
99, at 23, 299. For a discussion of uncertainties caused by language interpretation
in East Timor, see FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 69–72. For a
discussion of uncertainties caused by language interpretation at the ICC, see
Lubanga Judgment, supra note 22, ¶¶ 113–114; Ngudjolo Judgment, supra note
104, ¶ 62. For a discussion of uncertainties caused by language interpretation at
the ICTR, see Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgement and
Sentence, ¶ 23 (Dec. 6, 1999); see also Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-I-T,
Transcript, at 47 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1996);
Prosecutor v. Mucić et al., Case No. IT-96-21, Transcript, at 6797–98 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 4, 1997).
The need for language interpretation not only gives rise to inaccurate reporting
but sometimes also sabotage. See NYSTEDT ET AL., supra note 129, at 85 (“Past
experience in conflict issues shows that infiltration of mission is most frequently
accomplished through the use of interpreters and other local staff.”).
225. See FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 68–73.
226. See, e.g., Del Ponte, supra note 52, at 552 (noting that “international
judges are not from the region and generally have no knowledge of relevant
factors such as geography, locations where the crime took place, distances,
language, cultural sensitivities and relevant political or historical background.”).
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Tim Kelsall’s book, Culture Under Cross-Examination, provides an
in-depth account of the way in which Sierra Leonean culture
created significant challenges for SCSL personnel who were
unfamiliar with it.227 My own research, likewise, has documented
numerous errors and misunderstandings that resulted from the
failure of international court personnel to understand such aspects
of local culture as taboos and superstitions,228 sexual mores,229 and
patterns of demeanor and speech.230 Lawyers and judges at
international, hybrid, and foreign courts have been confused by
witnesses who invoke non-Western understandings of family
relationships,231 witnesses who refuse to provide direct answers to
questions involving sensitive topics,232 and witnesses who fail to
distinguish between events they witnessed and events that had
been described to them,233 among other things. Of course, such
confusion is likewise possible in domestic courts of the state where
227. See generally TIM KELSALL, CULTURE UNDER CROSS-EXAMINATION:
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 2 (2009).
228. FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 89–94.
229. See id. at 86–88 (“Cultural taboos surrounding sexual violence have also
given rise to communication difficulties at the international tribunals.”).
230. See id. at 98–100 (“A final arena in which cultural norms can impede
communication between international witnesses and their Western listeners
relates to patterns of speech and modes of communication.”); Cryer, supra note
224, at 428–29 (“The role of culture in witness evaluation and understanding is
also a matter to which attention should be paid.”).
231. See Fofana Transcript, Nov. 8, 2004, supra note 180, at 28 (featuring a
witness who initially described a woman as her sister but subsequently
acknowledged that the woman was only a friend); Fofana Transcript, Nov. 11,
2004, supra note 181, at 110 (presiding judge seeking to clarify witness’s
testimony about familial relationships); Witteveen, supra note 7, at 404
(describing the difficulty of determining whether a witness was the biological
mother of her son); FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 84–85
(describing broad notions of family relationships in East Timor that are at odds
with Western conceptions).
232. See Akayesu Judgment, supra note 21, ¶ 156 (“[I]t is a particular feature
of the Rwandan culture that people are not always direct in answering questions,
especially if the question is delicate.”).
233. See id. ¶ 155 (“Dr. Mathias Ruzindana noted that most Rwandans live in
an oral tradition in which facts are reported as they are perceived by the witness,
often irrespective of whether the facts were personally witnessed or recounted by
someone else.”); Musema Judgment, supra note 152, ¶ 103 (“[T]here appears, as
the Defence argued, to be in Rwandan culture a ‘tradition that the perceived
knowledge of one becomes the knowledge of all’ . . . .” (citation omitted));
Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript, at 49–50 (Mar. 1,
2005).
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the crime took place, but it is far less likely to occur when all of the
courtroom participants hail from the same country.
Territorial courts are also likely to have a comparative
advantage when it comes to conducting investigations. Some
contend that, in international and hybrid courts, “the standards
for collecting evidence [a]re not as high as in domestic
jurisdictions, which could generally rely on centuries of practice in
handling evidentiary issues.”234 But even if the relevant standards
are comparable, international court investigations are
comparatively disadvantaged by their distance from the crime
sites and the unfamiliarity that that distance begets. Some of that
unfamiliarity relates to the linguistic and cultural issues just
described. International investigators in the field, like the
international lawyers in the courtroom, must rely on interpreters
to communicate with potential witnesses.235 The use of
interpretation at the investigative stage is at least as likely to
create factual uncertainty as it does at trial simply because
interpretation increases the likelihood that factual errors will be
introduced. In addition, some investigations’ interpreters have
been found to be incompetent or otherwise inappropriate for their
positions,236 and witnesses frequently blame interpreters for
inaccurately interpreting their statements.237 International
investigators’ cultural unfamiliarity has also been cited as
negatively impacting investigations.238 Jackson and Brunger,
234. Jackson & Brunger, supra note 85, at 169.
235. FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 66.
236. See David Cohen, Indifference and Accountability: The United Nations
and the Politics of International Justice in East Timor, in EAST-WEST CENTER
SPECIAL REPORTS, NO. 9, at 27 (2006) (describing a Special Panels interpreter who
was in the “very early stages of learning English.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)); Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript,
at 17 (Mar. 2, 2005) (discussing a SCSL investigator who used unlicensed
interpreters who were connected with the witnesses being interviewed).
237. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 45 (July 7,
2005); see Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, at 100–
02 (Mar. 7, 2005) (maintaining that discrepancies appeared in statements
because the interpreters “didn’t listen clearly”); Brima Transcript, June 27, 2005,
supra note 179, at 59; Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript,
at 50 (Apr. 11, 2002) (“[G]iven the way that interpreter that particular morning
was doing interpretation, he was confused overall . . . .”); Prosecutor v.
Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-T, Transcript, ¶ 61 (Sept. 19, 2001).
238. See Jackson & Brunger, supra note 85, at 174 (“Another set of
problems . . . concerned the particular challenges in obtaining information from
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among other scholars, describe international investigators who
“failed to be culturally sensitive to the situation they were
investigating, ‘blundering in,’ as one [ICTY staff member]
described it, by asking a series of inappropriate questions that
could upset people.”239
International investigations are also hampered by the literal
distance between the international courtrooms and mass atrocity
crime sites. Domestic investigators, by definition, are located in
country and for that reason, they are able to conduct more
thorough, less time pressured investigations. International
investigators, by contrast, frequently must travel long distances to
reach crimes sites, and must conduct their operations within
specific, delineated time frames.240 In addition, because most
international investigators hail from far-off locations, they are
easily identified as outsiders, so locals may not trust them or may
fear retaliation if it becomes known that they provided information
to them.241 Local investigators, by contrast, are less likely to stand
out, so they can more easily gain access to witnesses and earn the
trust of local communities. Local investigators, finally, are apt to
be more familiar with the nuances of the conflict, the parties to the
conflict, and the impacted local communities;242 thus, they have a
better sense of where to start, whom to interview, and what to
ask.243 In recent years, international court investigations have
persons who came from unfamiliar cultures.”).
239. Id. (citation omitted).
240. See generally WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, INVESTIGATIVE
MANAGEMENT, STRATEGIES, AND TECHNIQUES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT’S OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 35–36 (2012) [hereinafter WAR CRIMES
RESEARCH OFFICE].
241. See, e.g., Jackson & Brunger, supra note 85, at 171.
242. See Bernard A. Muna, The Early Challenges of Conducting Investigations
and Prosecutions Before International Criminal Tribunals, OBSERVATIONS AT THE
COLLOQUIUM OF PROSECUTORS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS (Nov. 25–
27, 2004) (stating that local investigators “possess a bank of knowledge about
criminals in the country and have informers whom they can contact”).
243. For instance, Corinne Dufka was charged with educating SCSL
investigators about important contextual issues regarding the war in Sierra
Leone, but despite her efforts, many early investigators “remained unfamiliar
with the basic geographical lay of the land in Sierra Leone, and never quite
mastered the political power divisions and nature of the conflict between the
RUF, the AFRC and the CDF.” PENELOPE VAN TUYL, U.C. BERKELEY WAR CRIMES
STUDIES CTR., EFFECTIVE, EFFICIENT, AND FAIR?: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
INVESTIGATIVE PRACTICES OF THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR AT THE SPECIAL
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been subject to scathing criticism often because they were unable
to overcome some of the challenges just delineated.244 Domestic
investigations, though not without their own challenges, do escape
some of the most significant impediments to accurate fact-finding
that international and foreign tribunals confront.245
Finally, we can assume that the factual findings of territorial
courts are less likely to be distorted by perjured testimony. To be
sure, perjury occurs in both domestic and international tribunals.
Ample evidence exists, for instance, that witnesses before the
ICTR and witnesses before Rwandan domestic courts have
provided false testimony.246 But there is also reason to believe that
witnesses are less likely to lie when their lies are more likely to be
detected, and domestic investigators and judges—due to their
proximity and familiarity with the conflict and its participants—
are more likely to detect lies. Indeed, Rwanda’s gacaca courts
dispensed justice “on the grass” in the heart of local communities,
and one of the most significant perceived advantages of such local

COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 50 (2008).
244. See Damien Vandermeersch, Prosecuting International Crimes in
Belgium, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 400, 416 (2005) (“[W]e wish to cast a critical glance
on the methods of the International Tribunals’ investigators . . . .”); Alison Des
Forges & Timothy Longman, Legal Responses to Genocide in Rwanda, in MY
NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS
ATROCITY 49, 53 (Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein eds., 2004) (discussing
criticisms of ICTR investigations). ICC prosecutors in particular have been the
target of blistering criticism, most notably from ICC judges. See Ngudjolo
Judgment, supra note 104, ¶¶ 115–123 (describing deficiencies in prosecutorial
investigations). Criticism has also come from commentators who have questioned
the prosecution’s “small team” approach to investigations. See generally WAR
CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, supra note 240, at 4–5, 24–30. Additionally,
commentators have criticized prosecutors’ failure to conduct more in-state
investigations. See Buisman, supra note 80, at 45–54. Finally, commentators have
urged ICC prosecutors to adopt a more informed approach to investigations. See
Dermot Groome, No Witness, No Case: An Assessment of the Conduct and Quality
of ICC Investigations, 3 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 1, 5–28 (2014).
245. See Buisman, supra note 80, at 45–54 (“As a result of their infrequent
presence in the crime-base areas, many steps a diligent prosecutor anywhere in
the world would be expected to take have so far not been taken.”).
246. For a discussion of perjury at the ICTR, see Nancy Amoury Combs, A
New Look at Fact-Finding at the ICTR: Advances in Judicial Acknowledgement,
26 CRIM. L.F. 387, 392–96 (2016). For Rwandan domestic courts, see Des Forges &
Longman, supra note 244, at 59 & 66 n.37 (“[F]alse accusations were used to settle
scores, exact vengeance, or for political purposes.”).
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justice was its ability to ascertain what actually happened.247
Proponents of gacaca, in particular, believed that witnesses would
be less likely to testify falsely—or to get away with it if they did—
when surrounded by their neighbors who could easily contradict or
refute their falsehoods.248
All of the factors just described suggest that territorial courts
have a greater capacity to find accurate facts than fully
international courts, but as noted at the outset, other fora exist for
the prosecution of mass atrocities, including foreign courts and
hybrid domestic/international courts. Turning first to foreign
courts, reports of practitioners suggest that they experience many,
if not all, of the same fact-finding challenges that fully
international courts confront. Martin Witteveen, a Magistrate in
the District Court of The Hague, for instance, describes witnesses’
cultural practices that are unfamiliar to Dutch judges,249
witnesses’ patterns of speech that are unfamiliar to Dutch
judges,250 and interpretation difficulties that are even more
challenging than those that arise in international courts due to the
difficulty of finding competent interpreters who can translate the
witnesses’ testimony into uncommon languages such as Dutch.251
247. See PHIL CLARK, THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA: JUSTICE WITHOUT LAWYERS 189–90 (2011).
248. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUSTICE COMPROMISED: THE LEGACY OF
RWANDA’S COMMUNITY BASED GACACA COURTS 28 (2011) (describing the
expectation that “the local community’s participation at trials would be sufficient
to guarantee a fair trial because community members could speak out if a witness
lied and could question witnesses”).
249. Witteveen, supra note 7, at 403.
250. See id. at 405–06 (highlighting the cultural issues that had to be
explained to Dutch judges).
251. Id. at 400. As a Human Rights Watch Report described it:
[S]everal practitioners with experience in extraterritorial investigators
noted that translation problems hampered their ability to assess the
reliability of a potential witness’s statement. Belgian investigators who
traveled to Rwanda relied on local authorities to question witnesses in
the local language, Kinyarwanda, and commented that it was often
difficult to determine whether a question was being accurately put to
the witness. When on one occasion British investigators hired a
translator in Afghanistan, they discovered upon returning to the UK
that the translations were inaccurate, forcing them to make another
trip to Afghanistan with a professional translator in order to re-take
the statements.
NEHAL BHUTA & JÜRGEN SCHURR, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
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Other scholars and practitioners involved in foreign court
prosecutions of mass atrocities identify similar evidentiary
challenges.252 Indeed, Belgian officials charged with investigating
genocide crimes in Rwanda were so aware of the fact-finding
difficulties facing foreigners that they called upon Rwandan
officials to conduct the investigations.253 As investigating judge
Damien Vandermeersch put it, in addition to “an increased
knowledge of the field and the culture, local authorities could take
testimony in the witnesses’ language (kinyarwanda), which
enabled them to corroborate the truth of their statements and
limited subsequent challenges to the translation, since it was
always possible to refer to the original statement taken in
kinyarwanda.”254
To be sure, important differences in the fact-finding
competencies of international courts and foreign courts may also
exist. Domestic criminal justice systems may have more or fewer
resources than ad hoc international courts, and their
investigations staff may have more or less training. In addition,
fact-finding at international courts may be uniquely impeded by
the fact that they must synthesize the work of staff who are
recruited from around the world and whose work habits and
pre-dispositions are necessarily informed by a variety of cultural
and legal backgrounds. Thus, if we view accurate fact-finding
capacity as a continuum with territorial courts having the greatest
capacity, then these differences might, in a particular case, move
international courts or foreign courts closer to or farther from the
IN EUROPE: THE STATE OF THE ART

17 (2006).
252. See Kamminga, supra note 221, at 959 (describing the practical problem
of obtaining evidence of offenses committed abroad); Vandermeersch, supra note
244, at 410 (“Due to the extraneous nature of such cases, administering evidence
for crimes against international humanitarian law committed abroad is
particularly cumbersome and requires substantial resources.”); see also Bruce
Broomhall, Towards the Development of an Effective System of Universal
Jurisdiction for Crimes Under International Law, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 399, 412
(2001) (“The exercise of universal jurisdiction raises special evidentiary
challenges because the majority of the evidence necessary to make out a case may
lie in the control of another jurisdiction . . . .”).
253. See BHUTA & SCHURR, supra note 251, at 14 (“[A]ll six convictions in the
two trials of participants in the Rwandan genocide were built on investigations
carried out in Rwanda by the special Belgian police unit that deals exclusively
with international crimes.”).
254. Vandermeersch, supra note 244, at 413.
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ideal. However, it is the literal and figurative “distance”—in miles,
knowledge, culture, and language—between crime site and court
room that primarily distinguishes international and foreign courts
on the one hand and territorial courts on the other, and on these
measures international and foreign courts are largely
indistinguishable.
Conceptualizing accurate fact-finding capacity as a continuum
is also helpful in assessing the relative capacity of hybrid
tribunals. Admittedly, there is no fixed blueprint for hybrid
tribunals. Although they are all characterized by having both
international and domestic components, each tribunal features a
different amalgam of components, and each amalgam will impact
the tribunals’ ability to engage in accurate fact-finding. In general,
however, we can assume that hybrid tribunals with more domestic
features will enjoy greater fact-finding capacity than hybrid
tribunals with fewer domestic features. For instance, hybrid
tribunals that are located in the state where the crime took place
should gain some of the logistical and investigative advantages
that territorial criminal justice systems enjoy. Similarly, hybrid
tribunals that employ judges and lawyers from the state where the
crimes took place are likely to benefit from the cultural and
linguistic knowledge of the local personnel. Sierra Leonean and
Timorese judges and lawyers, for instance, regularly corrected
interpretation mistakes at the SCSL and Special Panels255 and
educated their international colleagues when witnesses’ cultural
inclinations created confusion.256

255. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript,
at 38–39 (Nov. 3, 2004) (featuring a Sierra Leonean judge who repeatedly insisted
(correctly) that the witness had said “yes” to a question, when the interpreter
interpreted the witness’s response as “no”); Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No.
SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript, at 48–49 (Mar. 10, 2005) (reporting that, although the
interpreter indicated that the witness said that he had beaten a victim, defense
counsel explained that the witness in fact claimed to have tied up the victim).
256. See Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 77–80
(July 19, 2004) (featuring witness testimony that did not make sense to Western
counsel until Sierra Leonean and Cameroonian judges explained a superstition
that underlay the testimony).
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V. Conclusion

Mass atrocity prosecutions are credited with advancing a host
of praiseworthy objectives,257 but none of these will be attained
unless those prosecutions are capable of finding accurate facts. We
have known for some years that finding those accurate facts can
prove a challenging enterprise.258 This Article explores why that is
so and what conditions make it more or less challenging. Just as
medical researchers identify particularly significant risk factors
for cancer, heart disease, and other ailments, this Article has
identified particularly significant risk factors for inaccurate
factual findings in mass atrocity trials.
This Article reveals that the proceedings most at risk for
factually inaccurate findings are international tribunal
prosecutions of international crimes in developing nations that
oppose the prosecutions. Some aspects of that finding are
unsurprising. For instance, no one would be shocked to learn of the
out-sized role that government opposition plays in creating factual
uncertainty at trial. Indeed, governmental opposition has been so
influential a factor that few international prosecutions of mass
atrocities in developing nations have even been attempted in the
face of it. The ICC took steps to bring such prosecutions in Kenya,
Sudan, and Libya, but those steps have dead-ended. Governmental
opposition has entirely thwarted the ICC’s efforts to prosecute
257. Some scholars have contended that mass atrocity prosecutions affirm the
rule of law in previously lawless societies, see, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN
VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS
VIOLENCE 25 (1998) (“To respond to mass atrocity with legal prosecutions is to
embrace the rule of law.”); RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 55–56 (2000)
(“Criminal justice plays a role not only in delineating individual and collective
responsibility but relatedly in defining legitimate institutions of judgment . . . .”),
advance peaceful transitions to democracy in post-conflict nations, see Cassese,
supra note 222, at 9–10 (asserting that “calling offenders to account” can bring
about a “return to peaceful relations on the ground”), deter future mass atrocities,
see Harvey M. Weinstein & Eric Stover, Introduction: Conflict, Justice and
Reclamation, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE
AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 1, 3–4 (2004), and create a historical record of the
conflict, see Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Evidence Before the ICTY, in ESSAYS
ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD
249, 252–53 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001); Antonio Cassese, Reflections on
International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. REV. 1, 6–9 (1998) (discussing the
advantages of international criminal tribunals).
258. Supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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mass atrocities in Sudan and Libya; neither Sudan nor Libya has
been willing to surrender defendants to the ICC,259 so no trials
have even begun. The ICC’s efforts to prosecute mass atrocities in
Kenya advanced slightly farther, but they met a similar fate260
amidst a plethora of credible claims that prospective witnesses had
been intimidated261 and even killed.262 The unsurprising
259. The ICC indicted three Libyan defendants, Muammar Gaddafi, Abdullah
al-Senussi, and Saif al-Islam Gaddafi. Muammar Gaddafi was killed before he
could be transferred to The Hague. See Kareem Fahim et al., Violent End to an
Era as Qaddafi Dies in Libya, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/world/africa/qaddafi-is-killed-as-libyanforces-take-surt.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review). The al-Senussi case was found to be inadmissible before the
ICC. See Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, Al-Sensussi Case: Appeals Chamber
Confirms Case is Inadmissible Before ICC, ICC Press Release ICC-CPI20140724-PR1034
(July
24,
2014),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/
item.aspx?name=pr1034 (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). The ICC has made vigorous efforts to obtain custody over
Saif Gaddafi, but Libya has failed to surrender him. See Jennifer Easterday,
Prosecution Asks Chamber to Order Libya to Surrender Gaddafi to the ICC, INT’L
JUST. MONITOR (Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.ijmonitor.org/2015/08/prosecutionasks-chamber-to-order-libya-to-surrender-gaddafi-to-the-icc/ (last visited Jan. 22,
2018) (reporting the request by the Office of the Prosecutor to surrender Saif
al-Islam Gaddafi to the ICC) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Similarly, the ICC issued warrants of arrest for five Sudanese defendants,
Situation in Darfur, Sudan, ICC, ICC-02/05, https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur (last
visited Jan. 22, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review), but
none has been surrendered to the ICC, so no trials can begin. Fatou Bensouda
(ICC Prosecutor), Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, before the United
Nations Security Council on the Situation Darfur, pursuant to UNSCR 1593
(2005), UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.icccpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=161213-otp-stat-unsc-darfur (last visited Jan. 22,
2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
260. See generally Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-2027-Red-Corr, Public
redacted version of: Decision on Defence Applications for Judgments of Acquittal
(Apr. 5, 2016) (terminating case due to lack of evidence); Prosecution v. Kenyatta,
ICC-01/09-02/11-983, Notice of withdrawal of the charges against Uhuru Muigai
Kenyatta (Dec. 5, 2014) (prosecution withdrawing charges for lack of evidence
after prosecution witnesses were allegedly intimidated and recanted their
inculpatory statements); Prosecution v. Muthaura, ICC-01/09-02/11-687,
Prosecution notification of withdrawal of the charges against Francis Kirimi
Muthaura (Mar. 11, 2013) (same).
261. See Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-2027-Red-Corr, Public redacted
version of: Decision on Defense Applications for Judgments of Acquittal, Reasons
of Judge Eboe-Osuji, ¶¶ 141–181 (Apr. 5, 2016) (reporting substantial evidence of
interference with witnesses).
262. See Murithi Mutiga & David Smith, Discovery of Witness’s Mutilated
Body Feeds Accusations of State Killings, GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2015, 1:55 PM),
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take-away from this Article’s analysis, therefore, is that
governments that oppose international court prosecutions not only
have the power to distort factual findings, they also have the power
to prevent prosecutions entirely.263
The surprising conclusion to emerge from this study is that
the proceedings most at risk for factually inaccurate findings are
international tribunal prosecutions of international crimes in
developing nations. This conclusion is not only startling but
troubling because international criminal tribunals have been
considered the gold standard institutions for the prosecution of
mass atrocities. Proponents view them as more neutral than
domestic courts,264 more legitimate than domestic courts,265 and
more appropriate for the prosecution of crimes that have global—
and not just domestic—impact.266 To be sure, some scholars have
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/06/witness-mutilated-body-kenyagovernment-killing-meshack-yebei-william-ruto (last visited Jan. 22, 2018)
(reporting on the gruesome murder of a man who was due to testify in the ICC
trial of Kenya’s deputy president) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
263. Numerous other examples exist. Cambodia opposes the ECCC’s efforts
to prosecute Cases Nos. 003 and 004 and thus far has been able to prevent the
prosecutions from moving forward. See Cambodia: Stop Blocking Justice for
Khmer Rouge Crimes, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 22, 2015 11:07 PM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/03/22/cambodia-stop-blocking-justice-khmerrouge-crimes (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (examining the Cambodian government’s
refusal to cooperate in bringing Khmer Rouge leaders before the ECCC) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Similarly, Indonesia refused to
surrender Special Panels’ indictees and thereby prevented their prosecutions. See
David Cohen, Accountability in the Balance: Trials Before the Special Panels for
Serious Crimes in East Timor 1999–2005, in CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS 103, 126 (Magda Karagiannakis ed., 2009).
264. See Cassese, supra note 221, at 7; see also B.V.A. Röling, The Law of War
and the National Jurisdiction Since 1945, in COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 323, 354 (1960-II).
265. See Laura Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L.
295, 301–03 (2003) (arguing that hybrid international courts ameliorate some of
the legitimacy concerns that arise when domestic courts seek to prosecute mass
atrocities).
266. See MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 6
(2007) (describing the view that mass atrocities are “so egregious that they
victimize all of us and, hence, must be condemned internationally”); Alain Pellet,
Internationalized Courts: Better than Nothing . . ., in INTERNATIONALIZED
CRIMINAL COURTS: SIERRA LEONE, EAST TIMOR, KOSOVO, AND CAMBODIA 437, 438
(Cesare P.R. Romano et al. eds., 2004) (explaining that mass atrocities are of
concern to the international community as a whole “and it is then important that
they not be ‘confiscated’ by any particular state including the one in which the
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contested this vision and highlighted the cost-effectiveness of
domestic courts267 and their arguably greater credibility in the eyes
of local communities.268 But most scholars have continued to
consider international criminal tribunals to be most capable of
providing the kind of state-of-the-art justice that the international
community seeks to deliver. International criminal courts spend
fantastic sums269 in an effort to uphold their defendants’ due
process rights and to comply with international human rights
norms more generally.270 That their prosecutions face an enhanced
risk of factual inaccuracy is thus a highly unwelcome conclusion.
Unwelcome or not, it is a conclusion that must be faced.
Finding accurate facts is not one among a host of equally important
values: it is arguably the most important, foundational function at
the core of mass atrocity prosecutions, in whatever form they take.
crime has been committed or of which the victims or the authors are nationals”);
cf. Margaret M. deGuzman, Harsh Justice for International Crimes?, 39 YALE J.
INT’L L. 1, 27 (2014) (“[T]he central project of international criminal courts is to
build a normative community . . . .”).
267. See William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The
International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of
International Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 68 (2008) (“National courts also are
generally the most cost-effective entities to undertake prosecutions . . . .”).
268. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Letter Dated 1 October 1994 From the
Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, ¶ 134, U.N.
Doc. S19941125 (Oct. 4, 1994) (opining that domestic courts might be more
attuned to the needs of local communities and can issue judgments that may have
“greater and more immediate symbolic force because they were rendered by courts
familiar to the local community”); José E. Alvarez, Crimes of StateCrimes of Hate:
Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 403–04 (1999) (“[I]t matters a great
deal [to Rwandan victims and survivors] whether an alleged perpetrator of mass
atrocity is paraded before the local press, judged in a local courtroom in a
language that they can understand, subjected to local procedures, and given a
sentence that accords with local sentiments . . . .”); Mark A. Drumbl, Collective
Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 NW.
U. L. REV. 539, 596–99, 610 (2005).
269. See Nancy Amoury Combs, From Prosecutorial to Reparatory: A Valuable
Post-Conflict Change of Focus, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 219, 227 n.28 (2015) (“[T]he
ICC [has spent] approximately $1.5 billion between 2003 and 2014.”).
270. See Jackson, supra note 7, at 22–23 (“[A] core aim remains the need to
determine whether accused persons are guilty of international crimes and there
is a consensus that for this purpose there needs to be full adherence to
international fair trial norms.”). See generally Wolfgang Schomburg, The Role of
International Criminal Tribunals in Promoting Respect for Fair Trial Rights, 8
NW. J. HUM. RTS. 1 (2009); KRIT ZEEGERS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: ADHERENCE AND CONTEXTUALIZATION (2016).

298

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 223 (2018)

If a mass atrocity trial cannot find facts to an appropriate level of
certainty, then it cannot legitimately achieve any other goal.
Consequently, the risk factors identified in this Article should
inform prosecutorial charging decisions as well as institutional
design. Although a vast body of literature exists regarding the
ICC’s selection of cases and situations,271 none of it centers on the
ICC’s relative fact-finding competence in differing arenas.
Likewise, although a vast body of literature considers the relative
merits of different types of criminal justice systems for the
prosecution of mass atrocities,272 heretofore, these merits have
rarely included fact-finding competence. But they should.
Although it might be abstractly preferable to charge mass
atrocities as international crimes rather than domestic crimes,273
271. See, e.g., Fabricio Guariglia, The Selection of Cases by the Office of the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 209 (Carsten Stahn & Göran Sluiter eds., 2008);
Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of
Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L L.
510, 511 (2003); Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive
Selection at the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 267 (2012)
(“[T]his Article seeks to reframe the debate about the ICC’s selection decisions by
shifting from the current focus on the boundaries between ‘legal’ and ‘political’
criteria to a constructive dialogue about the most appropriate goals and priorities
for the Court.”). See generally Alette Smeulers et al., The Selection of Situations
by the ICC: An Empirically Based Evaluation of the OTP’s Performance, 15 INT’L
CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2015) (evaluating the ICC Prosecutor’s situation selection policy);
William A. Schabas, Victor’s Justice: Selecting “Situations” at the International
Criminal Court, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 535 (2010); The Selection of Situations
and Cases for Trial before the International Criminal Court, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH
(Oct. 26, 2006, 5:33 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2006/10/26/selectionsituations-and-cases-trial-international-criminal-court (last visited Jan. 22,
2018) (recommending criteria for the ICC Prosecutor to consider in the selection
of situations and cases) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
272. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, The Role of Internationalized Courts and
Tribunals in the Fight Against International Criminality, in INTERNATIONALIZED
CRIMINAL COURTS: SIERRA LEONE, EAST TIMOR, KOSOVO, AND CAMBODIA 3 (Cesare
P.R. Romano et al. eds., 2004) (comparing international criminal tribunals and
courts with mixed or internationalized tribunals and courts, and examining the
reasons motivating the establishment of these mixed or internationalized courts);
Alvarez, supra note 268, at 366 (examining the arguments that have been used
to justify the creation, jurisdiction, and ongoing operation of the Balkan and
Rwanda tribunals); Drumbl, supra note 268, at 539.
273. See DRUMBL, supra note 266, at 4 (2007); see also Suzannah Linton,
Prosecuting Atrocities at the District Court of Dili, 2 MELB. J. INT’L L. 414, 422
(describing the frustration of the East Timorese judge that because all but one of
the then-current indictments charged domestic crimes); id. at 438 (reporting the
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perhaps that preference should be reconsidered if it will be harder
to find the facts of international crimes. Although one case or
situation may feature arguably graver crimes than another, the
less grave case or situation should be seriously considered if the
facts thereof can be found to a higher level of certainty. Finally, the
selection and design of prosecutorial bodies should be informed by
their relative fact-finding competence. It is unquestionably
relevant that a criminal justice system has impartial judges or
greater resources for criminal defense, but that criminal justice
system’s capacity to find accurate facts is at least an equally
important metric on which it should be assessed.
Fact-finding competence is so foundational that it is often
taken for granted by scholars and commentators. Scholars theorize
about the capacity of mass atrocity prosecutions to effect
deterrence274 or impose retribution,275 but they blithely assume
many concerns voiced about the prosecution's failure to lay charges for
international crimes).
274. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Justice and Peace: The Importance of
Choosing Accountability over Realpolitik, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 191, 192
(2003) (arguing that sacrificing justice and accountability for the immediacy of
realpolitik represents a short-term vision of expediency over the more enduring
human value of deterrence); Alejandro Miguel Garro & Enrique Dahl, Legal
Accountability for Human Rights Violations in Argentina: One Step Forward and
Two Steps Backward, 8 HUM. RTS. L.J. 283, 343 (1987); Diane F. Orentlicher,
Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior
Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2544 (1991) (“[T]o the extent that a deterrence
rationale justifies prosecution of state crimes, the underlying objective is best
served when international law precludes the possibility of impunity.”). See
generally Kate Cronin-Furman, Managing Expectations: International Criminal
Trials and the Prospects for Deterrence of Mass Atrocity, 7 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL
JUST. 434 (2013) (surveying the theory of criminal deterrence in order to assemble
a more clearly specified set of expectations about how deterrence might be
expected to operate in the international arena); Hyeran Jo & Beth Simmons, Can
the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?, 70 INT’L ORG. 226 (2016)
(assessing the deterrent effects of the ICC for both state and non-state actors);
Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or
Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777 (2007); Jaime
Malamud-Goti, Transitional Governments in the Breach: Why Punish State
Criminals?, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 9 (1990) (“Deterrence as fear of suffering future
punishment . . . is unlikely to be effective in cases where military personnel
engage in human rights violations.”).
275. See, e.g., deGuzman, supra note 271, at 303 (“Whatever its force as a
justification for punishment, retribution does not provide an adequate basis for
most ICC selection decisions.”); Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, International
Criminal Law for Retributivists, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 969 (2014) (arguing that
retributivism can provide a meaningful framework for understanding
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their capacity to find accurate facts, a capacity that necessarily
underlies the higher-order goals that these commentators seek to
advance. This Article reveals that fact-finding competence, like
most important values, is not evenly distributed across different
kinds of crimes or prosecutions. The careful unpacking of that
unequal distribution that emerges from this Article should guide
policymakers henceforth.

international criminal law); Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of
International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the
Potential of International Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 39, 81 (2007)
(arguing that retribution is a problematic justification for international criminal
law punishment because it presupposes a coherent community and relatively
stable sociopolitical or legal order characterized by shared values); Andrew K.
Woods, Moral Judgments & International Crimes: The Disutility of Desert, 52 VA.
J. INT’L L. 633 (2011).

